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ABSTRACT

Building upon examinations of genericity, subalternity, and carcerality by Black,
Indigenous, and women-of-color feminist scholars, my dissertation offers an account of how
truth claims are produced and sustained to limit social change in representatively governed
societies. Taking the gangster genre as my lens, I first resituate the form, assumed to depict
white-ethnic conflict in the U.S. and Europe, as a type of resistance to race-based political
economic policies imposed by imperial regimes. After linking the subaltern classes of pre-20thcentury southern Europe, southern Africa, South Asia, and the U.S. South—all subjected to
criminalization as a mode of colonial and capitalist control—I examine the contemporary politics
of gangsterism in India, South Africa, and the U.S. For each nation-state I show how liberaldemocratic institutions co-opt and mystify the liberatory impulses in original cultural
productions deemed “gangster”: in India, through the English-language literary establishment’s
circulation of gangster-film-derived narratives of putatively anti-social violence; in South Africa,
through the state broadcaster’s transformation of a post-apartheid TV series meant to educate
white viewers about white supremacy into one that scapegoated Black gangsters; and in the U.S.,
through the mass-entertainment industry’s erasure of fugitivity in pop versions of the gangsta-rap
subgenre of trap music—a contemporary version of the sleight-of-hand necessary to reproduce
slavery, as Harriet Jacobs showed in Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl (1861).
Weaving together historical, political, and comparative analysis and close readings of
media, literature, critical theory, and archival documents, I conclude that dominant forms of
representation across the former British empire appropriate the struggles of racialized and
Indigenous peoples and revise them to suit the disciplinary aims of the international order—and
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that non-generic cultural expression (like transdisciplinary movement-based art) eludes this
strategy. At a time when mass incarceration, immigrant detention, and the prison-industrial
complex are drawing greater attention than ever, my investigation provides fresh insights into the
textual and structural nuances of these systems.
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PREFACE

This dissertation is an experiment in global political-cultural studies. It combines my
baseline training in the analysis of Anglophone literary representations with my study of other
disciplines and, especially, the critical interdisciplines at the margins of academia. The histories
and scholarship of Black studies, Indigenous studies, colonial and postcolonial studies, and
diaspora studies were crucial to the development of this project, and I’m committed to them as
the foundation of my research, teaching, service, and organizing agendas. I try to honor a key
lesson of these fields: that to understand any aspect of politics or culture, one must attend first
and foremost to the people who’ve been excluded from dominant structures.
I liken my dissertation to an experiment because I attempt to do this work of turning the
world upside down (as Guha puts it in his historiography of the rebellion against the British
empire by the Indigenous peoples of South Asia1) without telling any people’s stories. I don’t tell
any people’s stories, or make any representations on their behalf, because they aren’t mine to
tell. In this way, I refuse a central disciplinary protocol of both the social sciences and the
humanities rooted in settler colonialism.2
Instead, I tell the stories of institutions, including academia, that reproduce the
imaginative, rhetorical, intellectual, and lingual methodologies that rationalized Europe’s

1

Ranajit Guha, “The Prose of Counter-Insurgency,” in Selected Subaltern Studies, ed. Ranajit
Guha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 45. Essay
originally published 1983.
2
See, for example, Audra Simpson, “Ethnographic Refusal: Anthropological Need,” in Mohawk
Interruptus: Political Life Across the Borders of Settler States (Durham: Duke University Press,
2014), and Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang, “R-Words: Refusing Research,” in Humanizing
Research: Decolonizing Qualitative Inquiry with Youth and Communities, edited by Django
Paris and Maisha T. Winn (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2014).
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settlement, subordination, and oppression of Indigenous peoples across the world and which now
authorize the persistence of inequalities that are the legacies of European conquest.
As such, I hope my project is a model for doing English studies otherwise: a
disciplinarily reflective endeavor that takes the English language and its global circulation via
British imperialism as the starting point for inquiry into the lasting effects of empire and its
structures. Finally, I hope this study illuminates some strategies for eliminating these structures
and their effects, most especially those regulated by representation, a governing technique that
mitigates the efforts of people to address their needs and change their situations on their own
terms, not on the terms of their representatives.
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INTRODUCTION

On the Generic Origins of Man, or the Metaphysics of “Crime”

Reader be assured this narrative is no fiction.
—Harriet Jacobs (1861)

In an interview with Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak that serves as the preface to Mahasweta
Devi’s 1993 collection of short stories, Imaginary Maps, the late Bengali writer provided a
capsule history of how the Indigenous peoples of South Asia—known as the adivasis—came to
exist on the margins of postcolonial Indian society. That history starts with the British colonial
authorities, who, in their settlement of the region,
had isolated the small tribes. They were afraid to touch the majority tribes for fear of
widespread havoc. They branded the small tribes as criminal tribes because they lived in
the forest and did not take to cultivation. These tribes had no concept of money. They
would come out of the forest, go to the village market, place honey, leaves, roots,
flowers, and silently take away whatever they needed: rice, oil, spices. So they were
thieves!1
That “branding” of “small tribes” as “criminal tribes” by the British was a formal process
enshrined in the Criminal Tribes Acts beginning in 1871, through which whole groups of
Indigenous peoples were designated as innately criminal. Their purported offenses ranged from

1

Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and Mahasweta Devi, “The Author in Conversation,” in Imaginary
Maps, edited and translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (New York: Routledge, 1995), xiii.
Originally published 1993.
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the “silently tak[ing] away” of basic subsistence items such as “rice, oil, spices,” to the
campaigns of murder the Thugs allegedly committed—a British-colonial projection that lives on
in every reference to lower-case “thugs.”2 At the time of Indian independence in 1947, there
were some 13 million Indigenous peoples criminalized in this way, essentially trapped in
officially defined areas because of carceral restrictions that limited their movement and
compelled them to report regularly to law enforcement.3 And though the Indian national
government began to “denotify,” or remove, such criminal designations from 1952 on, the
afterlife of such decades-long identification has meant that those groups of people originally
“notified” and their descendants continue to be regarded as suspicious and remain ill-treated by
the Indian police and criminal-justice system.4
In addition to Britain’s criminalizing scheme, the developmentalist ethos of capitalism—
as much a product of British colonialism as the English language of Indian elites—persisted into
the formally decolonized era. Devi goes on to describe the deforestation and land enclosure
perpetrated by the Indian state after 1947, a campaign of dispossession that underscores the

2

British colonizers imagined the Thugs to be mobile gangs of murderers who preyed on
“innocent travelers and then stole all of their belongings” in order to offer them up to the Hindu
goddess Kali. Like European myths about New World cannibals, settler claims about the Thugs
were based far more in fantasy and the imperative of colonial governance to cast human
difference as dangerous and fearful than in any actual reality. See Martine van Woerkens, The
Strangled Traveler: Colonial Imaginings and the Thugs of India, trans. Catherine Tihanyi
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), from which I quote at 2. On the lower-case use of
“thugs,” see, for example, this 2015 National Public Radio interview with scholar John
McWhorter: https://www.npr.org/2015/04/30/403362626/the-racially-charged-meaning-behindthe-word-thug.
3
Crispin Bates, “Race, Caste, and Tribe in Central India: The Early Origins of Indian
Anthropometry,” Edinburgh Papers in South Asian Studies, no. 3 (1995): 10,
http://www.csas.ed.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/38426/BATES_RaceCaste_and_Tribe.pdf.
The author cites a variety of work from the 19th and 20th centuries on this topic.
4
S. Viswanathan, “Suspects Forever,” Frontline, June 8–21, 2002,
https://web.archive.org/web/20081202171820/http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl1912/1912045
0.htm.
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ongoing structure of settler colonialism despite the formal end of Britain’s presence on the
subcontinent. Stated Devi:
With the felling of the forests, these tribes were exposed to the current savagery. They
did not know where to go, they did not have any land. In the 1950s, the government of
India “denotified” these tribes. The society immediately adjacent to where they now
live—the police and the administration—still see them as thieves, robbers, criminals. And
definitely use them in criminal activities. And on their backs grow rich. In West Bengal
there are only two such denotified tribes, the Lodhas of Medinipur, and the Sobors.
Kheria is also a Sobor or hunter tribe. That is how it was discovered that between 1979
and 1982, about forty Lodhas were lynched. In 1978, I formed the Lodha Organization
which started protests. I investigated when a Lodha killing took place, and I wrote…My
state government finally had to recognize that Lodhas were human beings after all.5
In this brief narrative, Devi linked land and indigeneity to crime and criminalization—the latter,
as she indicated, a process whereby people with less power are designated as “criminal” by
people with more power for political economic gain. Because of the “felling of the forests”—and
the general dispossession of people’s land by the postcolonial Indian government, affecting some
20 to 60 million persons and counting6—Indigenous peoples within the Indian nation-state were
rendered surplus (“They did not know where to go, they did not have any land”). And as Ruth
Wilson Gilmore has shown, surpluses are the building blocks of the prison-industrial complex—
and one of the illusory “fixes” for a surplus of workers (or would-be workers, in the case of

5

Spivak and Devi, “The Author in Conversation,” xiii.
Sanjoy Chakravorty, The Price of Land: Acquisition, Conflict, Consequence (New Delhi:
Oxford University Press, 2013), xxiii.
6
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adivasi peoples who continue to resist the labor discipline of the Indian state7) is to disappear
them into cages.8
I take up Gilmore’s California-centered, though globally informed, argument more
extensively in the third chapter of this study, set in the United States, but suffice it to say now
that other scholars in the growing field of carceral studies have demonstrated that the “prison
fix” is an international one.9 Although Devi didn’t explicitly discuss prisons in her conversation
with Spivak, she emphasized the foundations of carcerality that produced and reproduce the
prison as perhaps the preeminent site of racial capitalism and settler colonialism—the two
intertwined systems that jointly created and continue to shape global modernity. Indeed, the
primary work I aim to do in this manuscript—not fully realized in this rough draft—is to better
understand how these systems operate together, and how their original forms in the time period
known as the early modern have been altered or otherwise sustained so that both systems are still
functional—and functioning with such force—today.
I have focused this investigation into the interworkings of racial capitalism and settler
colonialism through the double lens of genre on the one hand and “crime” on the other, with
subalternity acting as a kind of analytical relay between the two. In the first instance, I wish to
open literary and cultural studies of genre to a much wider theoretical canvas that encompasses
the roots of genre in the classificatory system of natural life that was part of the scientific

7

See, for example, Arundhati Roy, Walking with the Comrades (New York: Penguin, 2011), in
which the author embeds with a group of “tribals” fighting the state in central India.
8
Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing
California (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2007), 85–86.
9
See, for example, Jordan T. Camp, Incarcerating the Crisis: Freedom Struggles and the Rise of
the Neoliberal State (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2016); Tryon P.
Woods, “The Gender Entrapment of Neoliberal Development,” Genders (spring 2012); and Julia
Chinyere Oparah, ed., Global Lockdown: Race, Gender, and the Prison-Industrial Complex
(New York: Routledge, 2004).
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revolution. The work of French botanist Joseph Pitton de Tournefort in his Éléments de
botanique ou méthode pour connaître les plantes (Elements of Botany or Method for Knowing
Plants; 1694) and Swedish scientist Carl Linneaus in Systema Naturae (1735) and subsequent
books crested in the theory of evolution espoused by Charles Darwin in On the Origin of Species
by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life
(1859). In this work, published as the British empire began to enter its third stage of conquest in
new areas of the globe,10 the taxonomic accounting of the organic world, which now included
humans and non-human animals in addition to plants, was suffused with a hierarchical
worldview that deemed some populations to be more advantaged for survival than others.
Moreover, this Darwinian economics was of a piece with the universalism that was being
espoused from the human sciences: a European notion of human equality that nevertheless
claimed Europeans as the most advanced of human species, with all other communities of people
placed in a descending order of value.
Denise Ferreira da Silva has called this system of knowledge the “knowledge apparatus,”
at the center of which is a human figure she describes as the “homo modernus”: the modern
“global/historical subject” against which all others—that is, objects—are rendered (and
rended).11 In effect, the homo modernus is the scientist, producing knowledge about the world
through his own solipsistic lens; in aggregate, this scientific knowledge apparatus produced “the
notion of the racial, which institutes the global as an onto-epistemological context—a productive

10

I follow Mahmood Mamdani’s chronology of British imperial expansion, in which,
vanquished in the United States’ portion of North America and then stymied in South Asia with
the rebellion of 1857, the Crown sought new opportunities for power elsewhere, most notably on
the African continent. See Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late
Colonialism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018/1996).
11
Denise Ferreira da Silva, Toward a Global Idea of Race (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2007), xii.
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and violent gesture necessary to sustain the post-Enlightenment version of the Subject as the sole
self-determined thing.”12 In other words, the temporal register of the historical was combined
with the spatial register of the global through the universalizing project of science. Put more
accessibly, what this means is that, prior to the scientific revolution (which coincided with
Europe’s “Age of Discovery”), man’s evolution was understood only through the variable of
time: newer generations of European people were thought to be more advanced than older
generations; there was no awareness of other people living elsewhere in the world. But, as both
the taxonomic process of modern science and the exploration process of modern empire grew,
the boundaries of the world for Europe’s people also grew, to the point that they eventually
began to understand themselves in relation to other people. And these other people, many of
whom were being colonized by European powers, found themselves subjected to the empirical
tools of the modern knowledge apparatus: the measurements of difference, the calculations of
intelligence, and the sundry other methods that were developed to distinguish European man
from everyone else and thus preserve his primacy. Altogether, these techniques amounted to
representation: what Ferreira da Silva calls the “political-symbolic arsenal” that accompanied
“the juridical domination and economic exploitation” of “global subalterns.”13 In this way,
European man represented himself as superior and all others as inferior; in so doing, he cast
human diversity in decidedly moral terms. More specifically, these moral terms—applied to
normal human variation—were irreducibly racialized, meaning that representations of European
man as morally superior were premised on other people being represented as racially inferior,
without any consideration of how those ostensibly inferior humans understood themselves on

12
13

Ferreira da Silva, Toward a Global Idea of Race, xii–xiii.
Ferreira da Silva, 14 and 34.
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their own terms, moral or otherwise. Ferreira da Silva’s argument in this regard complements
Sylvia Wynter’s more influential analytic of the genres of the human that, in her view, have
undergirded political, economic, and social relations since 1492.14 Indeed, where Ferreira da
Silva depicts homo modernus as the apex of humanity, Wynter sees “homo oeconomicus,” “the
Breadwinner/Investor subject of the nation-state,” with all other humans defined in relation to
him.15 Via Wynter, then, European man gains a certain political-economic charge.
Political economy also “haunts” Ferreira da Silva’s analysis, in the form of Black and
Brown people who have been killed by the police because of generic assumptions that circulate
about them. “You are black and young,” intones Ferreira da Silva’s imagined cop in the preface
to Toward a Global Idea of Race. “You live in a neighborhood where crime thrives. We take
guns out of the streets, arrest dangerous criminals,” the voice continues. “We approached your
building, you looked suspicious…”16 You looked suspicious—the only rationale given by
Ferreira da Silva’s police officer no matter whom he encounters, whether it’s an African
American teenager, an immigrant from an “African elite family,” or a Fulani person sans other
identifying details.17 Indeed, to the cop, all people with Black or Brown skin might as well be the
same; in Ferreira da Silva’s portrait, the officer is solely focused on his “job,” which is not just to
stop “crime” but also to preserve the symbolic power of race. “It is not just that we will not hire
you,” the police says, as if speaking now on behalf of the ruling class. “You help us to create a

14 For Wynter’s most extensive analysis of the genres of the human, see “Unsettling the
Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, After Man, Its
Overrepresentation—An Argument,” CR: The New Centennial Review 3, no. 3 (2003): 257–337.
15
Wynter, “On How We Mistook the Map for The Territory, and Re-Imprisoned Ourselves in
the Unbearable Wrongness of Being, of Désêtre: Black Studies Toward the Human Project,” in
Not Only the Master’s Tools: African-American Studies in Theory and Practice, edited by Lewis
R. Gordon and Jane Anna Gordon (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2006), 123.
16
Ferreira da Silva, Toward a Global Idea of Race, xi.
17
Ferreira da Silva, xi–xii.
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bond among white Americans. You make the system work.” To which the Black speaker asks,
“But if I do that…why kill me? If you just keep me in the ghetto, if I don’t have a decent school, a
decent-paying job, welfare rights. You have all the answers. You know me. Why do you need to
kill me? Isn’t being white enough?”18 Replies the cop: “Being white has never been enough. Not
without being black.” In this verisimilar scenario, Ferreira da Silva charts the broad psychic
economy that she takes apart throughout the rest of the book—a psychic economy of racial
difference that doesn’t correspond exactly to the political economy of racial capitalism. Put
another way, a Black person in the U.S. can play their structural role completely—remaining
trapped in the “ghetto,” attending severely under-resourced public schools (when they’re able to
attend) and working seriously underpaid jobs (when they’re able to find a job), with major
restrictions on their access to welfare benefits—and still be killed because the symbolic economy
of race depends on nonwhite people always being seen as a threat to white people (you look
suspicious). And this threat can always be put down by a “public safety” officer, whose own
structural role is to literally police the boundaries between different positionalities in the
hierarchy of humanity. In this way, the genre of “crime” is as fixed as it is racialized, with the
mere survival of global subalterns always a thorn in the side of homo modernus—unless, that is,
they can be locked up and disappeared. In essence, “public safety” means the status quo, and
political struggle is oriented by maintaining the status quo or changing it, either in reactionary
ways or in progressive ones.
I set off “crime” with quotation marks throughout this study to denaturalize it as an
ostensibly permanent—that is, generic—feature of society or history. Instead of being an a priori
phenomenon, “crime,” as Ferreira da Silva (like Devi) indicates, is a discourse produced through

18

Emphasis Ferreira da Silva’s.
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power relations and imposed on people who lack the sufficient legal and financial resources to be
read as non-criminal by the mainstream public. In this way, “crime”—or, more specifically,
“criminality,” “the quality or state of being criminal”19—is a form of subalternity in which
people deemed “criminal” cannot be defined in terms of their own choosing. The impossibility of
authoring oneself in ways that are legible to dominant readers is arguably the chief takeaway of
Spivak’s foundational analysis in “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” which demonstrated how South
Asian peoples were both absent in the colonial archive as well as fundamentally misapprehended
by colonial knowledge producers.20 Indeed, correcting colonial narratives in service to
supplanting them altogether was part of the ambition of the Subaltern Studies Group overall, as
can be seen in Ranajit Guha’s historiographical interventions to rewrite understandings of
resistance to the British Raj. These scholars’ efforts, however, were not motivated by restoring
some authentic reality of subaltern existence in place of elitist accounts; rather, the purpose of
“deconstructing historiography,” as Spivak described it in her introduction to Selected Subaltern
Studies (1988), was to expose the “cognitive failures” in the “production of ‘evidence,’ the
cornerstone of the edifice of historical truth, and to anatomize the mechanics of the construction
of the self-consolidating Other—the insurgent and insurgency.”21
One can hear the echo of Spivak’s formulation in Ferreira da Silva’s depiction some 20
years later of the subaltern—now globalized—as an inexorable threat to would-be sovereign
selves. And it can be heard as well in the work of Saidiya Hartman, who briefly references “the
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subaltern” in the methodological note at the beginning of Scenes of Subjection, her continuingly
influential examination of U.S. chattel slavery.22 Although she invokes the term to emphasize
both “the provisionality of the archive” and the irreducible dyad between “subaltern
consciousness” and “dominant representation” (quoting Spivak on the latter point),23 her
methodology of reading for the traces of enslaved people’s agency in spite of their lack of legal
personhood is arguably most pronounced in her chapter titled “Seduction and the Ruses of
Power.” In it, she assesses the limited options available for enslaved women who were raped by
their masters or who were targeted for such rape, as Harriet Jacobs was by her owner. In this
analysis, based in part on Jacobs’s 1861 narrative, Hartman meticulously shows how “crime”
was used to further subjugate enslaved people, and enslaved women especially. Indeed, if
“crime” wasn’t invented to bolster the slavery enterprise, then it was given both far more
structure as well as flexibility through that enterprise. In effect, what counted as “crime” grew,
imbuing the category with a fungibility that matched the fungibility of enslaved people as objects
with which slaveholders and their families could do anything. I take Hartman’s theorization of
“crime” in this regard as paradigmatic for the interchange between textual carcerality (discourses
of “crime”) and material carcerality (structures of criminalization) with which I am foremost
concerned in this study. And this relationship between the textuality and materiality of “crime”
directly factored into Antonio Gramsci’s original theory of subalternity, which he forwarded in
his treatise on the Southern Question, the completion of which was interrupted by his arrest and
incarceration by Italy’s fascist government in 1926. In other words, his theorization of
subalternity—as the condition of people locked out of a reigning political economic order—
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mirrored the material context of his imprisoning—in which he was locked away from society—
and vice versa. This coupling of carcerality and subalternity in the work of Gramsci and
Hartman—with additional valences in the work of Devi, Spivak, and Guha, among others—
suggests to me that carcerality and subalternity, like racial capitalism and settler colonialism,
might also be two sides of the same coin.
Altogether, the collective interventions I trace throughout this opening section clarify that
violence is an instrument of power, utilized for the advantage of some at the expense of others.
Violence is therefore plural—it materializes in any context of differential power, such as in
institutions—and it must be read as a legitimate form of expression when deployed by
disempowered people who have no other option to be heard. And yet the state, backed by capital
and working through institutional intermediaries, mystifies such violent responses in service to
securing the rule of law.24 In this respect, the gangster is an especially useful lens through which
to elucidate the relationship between the violences of “crime” and the violences of genre. Indeed,
cultural appropriation is its own type of violence. In the case of gangsterism, the presumption
that the exemplary figure of this genre is a white-ethnic American—The Godfather, as I heard
throughout the development of this study, no matter where I was in the world—does damage to
the racialized and Indigenous people who engage in activities deemed criminal just to survive
from day to day. Likewise, the common-sense notion that the gangster is motivated by economic
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concerns, whether monetary or psychodynamic, undermines the political impulses of those who
engage in “crime” to protest their unequal status, exploited resources, and inability to fully selfdetermine their lives.

“Crime” and Genre, or Grammar and Gender

In Hortense J. Spillers landmark essay “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe: An American
Grammar Book”—a bold, complex work that continues to inspire intellectual analysis and
creative production some three decades after its publication—she shows how the crimes against
humanity of chattel slavery were written into not just the “accounts and ledgers” of the agents
who orchestrated the system but also into the grammar of representation throughout slaverybased societies. 25 In this way, calculations concerning the market value of enslaved peoples on
the basis of their gender, embodiment, and other value forms—indeed, their humanity—were
woven into all aspects of the burgeoning settler societies of the Americas. In other words, all
representations of material reality were mediated, implicitly or explicitly, through reference to
chattel slavery and its valuations of humanness, labor, and life.
Making a distinctively psychoanalytic and deconstructive argument about the emergence
of racial capitalism in contrast to Cedric Robinson’s historicist and political economic account in
Black Marxism, Spillers—like Devi—cites (sites) gender as the conceptual terrain upon which
the material practices of slavery were worked out.
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Those African persons in the “Middle Passage” were literally suspended in the “oceanic,”
if we think of the latter in its Freudian orientation as an analogy for undifferentiated
identity: removed from the indigenous land and culture, and not-yet “American” either,
these captive persons, without names that their captors would recognize, were in
movement across the Atlantic, but they were also nowhere at all. Inasmuch as, on any
given day, we might imagine, the captive personality did not know where s/he was, we
could say that they were the culturally “unmade,” thrown in the midst of a figurative
darkness that “exposed” their destinies to an unknown course….We might say that the
slave ship, its crew, and its human-as-cargo stand for a wild and unclaimed richness of
possibility that is not interrupted, not “counted”/“accounted,” or differentiated, until its
movement gains the land thousands of miles away from the point of departure. Under
these conditions, one is neither female, nor male, as both subjects are taken into
“account” as quantities.26
This ascription upon landfall—of one’s ontology being authored by others into authorized terms
that can be read, “‘counted’/ ‘accounted’” for, “differentiated,” possessed as “quantities,” which
is to say valuable commodities—is the American grammar of the New World, where the racial
capitalism of the Middle Passage and slavery meets the settler colonialism of Native
dispossession and genocide. And in this grammar, homo oeconomicus reigns supreme, authoring
stories of “crime” in which the crimes against humanity generated by racial capitalism and settler
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colonialism are displaced onto the bodies and minds of the captured and coerced, the locked out
and the locked away.27
Spillers would go on to note, albeit many years later in a retrospective essay, that the
“accounting procedures” of the “emergent epistemologies” of the 1970s and ’80s—
“‘structuralism,’ ‘post-structuralism,’ ‘feminism,’ ‘postmodernism,’ to name a few”—
“inevitably excluded ‘black.’ In effect, we were given the peculiar occasion to observe the
troubling effects of a kind of intellectual and theoretical gerrymander that maintained, that staged
the prerogatives of apartheid with which we were well familiar from the political arena.”28 If the
“accounts and ledgers” of slavery had now turned into the “accounting procedures” of the
corporatizing university in the aftermath of the Civil Rights Movement’s triumphs of the mid1960s, that was because difference now had to be managed through the soft power of
professionalism rather than the hard power of coercion and dehumanization—informal violence
versus formal violence. Further, if “black” was excluded from the high theory of the time, that
was because it had been relegated to the margins of the academy in “emergent” interdisciplines
such as Black studies and women’s studies—and studies that crossed these fields and were
additionally marginalized because of it.29 In these ways I understand genre as a powerful form of
gerrymandering knowledge.
Finally, a glance at the etymology of genre shows that the term always already signifies
gender and vice versa. Derived from the “Anglo-Norman and Middle French gendre” per the
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Oxford English Dictionary, the word “genre,” whether in French or English, initially meant both
“kind” or “sort” and “gender,” “race,” or “people.” Accordingly, genre served to divide and
classify people according to their kind. In this way, the word is closely related to “genus,”
derived from the Latin, and which also originally meant “race, stock, kind” but also “birth.”
Meanwhile, “gender” denoted both sex-based and grammar-based types. Genre, genus, and
gender, then, are all translations: of each other, and of people’s social, phenomenological, and
relational experiences with other people in medieval and early modern Europe. But as
translations, genre, genus, and gender also upheld social divisions: they disavowed “transness,”
or the crossing of such divisions, in their very usage as sorting devices. And these divisions later
ramified with the onset of European political, economic, scientific, and intellectual modernity,
elaborated through colonialism, imperialism, racial capitalism, Darwinism, and other globalizing
projects grounded in difference.
In this regard, the argument I advance in this study about the classificatory roots of genre
is not different from that purveyed by Omi and Winant in their classic account of U.S. racial
formation, in which the age-old “identification of distinctive human groups” takes on worldshaping structural force with the discovery of Europe’s others in the New World of the
Americas.30 Distinctions between groups of people that once served as lower-case differences
sans the force of law now became entrenched categories of fundamental Difference backed by
sovereign violence and further authorized by and through the emerging apparatus of secular,
scientific knowledge. In short, categorizing difference as Difference was a tool with which to
capture and subdue such Difference as inscribed on the bodies of the Indigenous peoples of the
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Americas as well as on those of the Indigenous peoples of Asia (the “Orient”) and Africa.
Isolating and fixing “othered” groups of people as intrinsically Different from Europeans served
to palliate the violent and mortal actions of European colonizers, both for the architects of empire
and for their emergently national audiences. As Omi and Winant state, “The representation and
interpretation of the meaning of the indigenous peoples’ existence became a crucial matter, one
which would affect the outcome of the enterprise of conquest.”31 In other words, race became the
primary way to represent Difference in service to a conquest that continues to this day through
the interlinked systems of racial capitalism and settler colonialism. And because race came to
have such profound political economic significance, it also became a central organizing principle
of the consolidating nation-state.
Where my argument regarding genre is new, however, is in contending that (1) genre is
inseparable from both race and gender, and (2) that genre is a primary component of the
grammar of global modernity and not just reducible to a particularized form of culture or
entertainment. Although the current plethora of streaming services, with their seemingly endless
manufacture of content, has compelled mainstream cultural critics—as powerful a set of
gatekeepers as any—to call the present conjuncture a “peak genre” moment, I argue that this
understanding of genre misses the forest for the trees. Likewise, contemporaneous scholarship on
literary genres takes for granted genre as a prima facie category rather than one that is
contingently defined or that doesn’t need to be defined at all. Take one very recent example:
Yogita Goyal’s Runaway Genres: The Global Afterlives of Slavery, which was published as I
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finished writing this dissertation.32 Goyal contends that “seemingly new genres as the global
novel” or the child-soldier narrative “are not only deeply haunted but fundamentally shaped by
the slave narrative”; her monograph, meanwhile, “places such new genres within history,
reckoning with their geopolitical formation, as well as their aesthetic mutations as they circulate
across the world.”33 Goyal’s argument here is plausible, and there’s much to recommend
Runaway Genres, including the author’s melding of African American studies and postcolonial
studies to trace the global influence of enslavement narratives.34 Too, her attention to the
“morphing” of postcolonial literature “into global Anglophone, Global South, or world
literature” in current scholarship and classroom teaching is most welcome and resonates with my
own treatment of this literary rebranding, as I demonstrate in the first chapter of this study.
Where I differ from Goyal, however, is on the question of genre: both the porous criteria
she uses to define the enslavement narrative as a genre, and her limitation of that genre’s
influence to other genres of literature, instead of granting the enslavement narrative importance
beyond the confines of genre. On the first point—criteria—Goyal states that the following
components, in addition to a “sentimental idiom,” define the enslavement narrative as a genre:
“accounts of exile and natal alienation, the concept of social death, the quest for literacy, the
journey north to freedom, and dreams of the Jubilee.”35 But these elements aren’t consistent
across narratives of enslavement. Jacobs’s narrative, for example, isn’t marked by a quest for
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literacy, since her particular circumstances allowed her to become literate without much, if any,
strife. Nor does her life evince any semblance of social death, at least not to the level that
Afropessimist theory would have it.36 (If anything, the vitality of Jacobs’s life and affiliations, as
she underscores over and over in Incidents, even in the midst of great challenges, setbacks, and
suffering, seriously complicates the premise of social death.) Nor is there a strong sense of “natal
alienation” in Incidents, nor any “dreams of the Jubilee.” (Again, because of the relatively
privileged conditions of her enslavement, Jacobs was quite close to her immediate family—
indeed, were it not for the help of several relatives, she wouldn’t have made it to the North. And
instead of pining for official emancipation [“Jubilee”], Jacobs was squarely focused on getting
herself and her children free—and was bemused by the informal racism and continued servitude,
albeit uncoerced, she found above the Mason-Dixon line.) Out of Goyal’s seven criteria, then,
Incidents meets three: it’s an “account of exile” that also chronicles Jacobs’s “journey north to
freedom,” and it’s written in the “idiom” of sentimentalism. However, zooming out from
Incidents—and Frederick Douglass’s narrative, the most famous, and which exhibits most or all
of Goyal’s criteria—I wager it would be hard to find a consistent link between narratives of
enslavement other than their “stor[ies] of escape from bondage,”37 simply because of the great
variety of authors and the specificities of their lives and historical moments. In fact, the only way
Goyal can claim a genealogy between original enslavement narratives and the “neo-slave
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narrative”38 of today is to isolate the most generic—that is, non-specific—features of these two
genres—genres, in fact, that are simply general forms of literature. In this way, the new genre
studies, like the old genre studies,39 are symptomatic of the discipline of literary studies at large,
which continues to discipline the unbounded field of literary and expressive culture into genres
and their doubles (period, region, field, and so on). Accordingly, my study of genre necessarily
invites a reckoning with what I’d like to call the Westphalian system of the disciplines.
Moreover, at different moments in the manuscript I contemplate what anti-disciplinary forms of
knowledge, scholarship, and education might be. I consider one of these forms—
transdisciplinary art—at more length in the coda to this study.
To be sure, Goyal is interested in tracing the afterlives of slavery, and the neo-slave
narrative is as good as any contemporary “genre” for further delineating these afterlives. But
original narratives of enslavement had—and continue to have—far more than generic
significance: they shaped both the logic of modern literature as reader-based appeals to either
fact or fiction as well as the very arbitration of fact from fiction. When Harriet Jacobs opened her
preface to Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl with “Reader be assured this narrative is no
fiction,” she was not just explicitly appealing for readers’ attention or emphasizing that her
narrative was an autobiography and not a novel. In addition to these basic literary-studies
observations, Jacobs’s address of the reader is also noteworthy for its tacit metaphysical charge
about what the reader should believe: Jacobs’s own narrative of her life as an enslaved person as
she experienced it, or the representations made by slaveholders about the lives of the people they
enslaved. For as Jacobs points out throughout Incidents, owners and their families constantly
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portrayed both slavery overall and the experiences of enslaved people in falsely positive ways,
the better to preserve the peculiar institution in the face of ongoing movements to abolish it.
Much like the way members of the slaver class could do anything they wanted with their human
property, they also engaged in a strategic campaign of lies—what today would be called
whitewashing, or disinformation—in order to shore up their way of life. As well, at the same
time Jacobs critiqued this dubious public-relations effort, she also sought to pierce the veil of her
intended audience: white Northern women, who either didn’t know the full extent of the
depravities she and other enslaved people had experienced or didn’t want to know. Jacobs’s
adroit sense of the economy of information concerning the reality of slavery allowed her to
author a sharply detailed account of both her life and the institutional life of slavery that went
straight to the heart of a powerful constituency: white women in free states, who already
contended with disinformation about gender roles and women’s capabilities. By reading her
narrative, Jacobs hoped these women might align with her as a fellow woman, and, further, that
their own lived experiences might serve as a bridge to understanding hers. In this way, Jacobs represented her life to counter the fictions of the slaver class as well as those of putatively wellintentioned white liberals, such as Harriet Beecher Stowe, whom Jacobs spurned when the bestselling author asked to appropriate Jacobs’s story for her follow-up to Uncle Tom’s Cabin
(1852).40 And the question of truth was at the center of the two writers’ dialogue: Stowe needed
to first authenticate the veracity of Jacobs’s story in order to incorporate it into The Key to Uncle
Tom’s Cabin (1853), not believing that Jacobs was the author, while Jacobs was wary of how
Stowe might adjust Jacobs’s narrative to fit Stowe’s own textual strategies. “I wished it to be a
history of my life entirely by itself which would do more good and it needed no romance,”
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Jacobs wrote in reaction to Stowe’s outreach.41 Although The Key to Uncle Tom’s Cabin was
occasioned by charges that Stowe had falsely portrayed slavery in the original novel, Jacobs
understood that presenting her life “entirely by itself” would prove to be a more powerful
intervention. Nevertheless, she still needed to adopt a pseudonym when Incidents in the Life of a
Slave Girl was finally published a decade later, and she needed a different white female author—
Lydia Maria Child—to vouch for the truthfulness of the writing.
Goyal also attends to how original narratives of enslavement required such stamps of
approval from white writers and editors, and, further, how this racialized gatekeeping role still
exists for contemporary “stories of oppression from the Global South.”42 In this expanded
geographic frame—and here I am offering my own thoughts, not Goyal’s—writers located in
postcolonial nation-states must still pass a de facto authenticity test when approaching publishing
decision-makers in the Global North, who remain overwhelmingly white and are predominantly
concerned with reaching literary audiences that are similar to them: well-educated, well-paid,
and with a taste for literary fiction that’s both enjoyable and informative. As such, the aesthetic
education of elite readers in the Global North depends very much on a credible native informant
who can inform readers far removed from the informant’s specific locale about what’s going on
in that place. In this way, native informants of 21st-century global Anglophone literature—
typically the literary authors themselves—continue to fulfill the role of native informants in
colonized societies of earlier centuries: to explain to elites what’s happening with the subaltern
masses. Meanwhile, the actual people who compose those masses either lack the education, the
resources, the desire, or the cultural capital to prove their legitimacy as authors to multinational
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publishing concerns. The end result is that most people around the world still cannot tell their
own stories at scale—unless, that is, they employ a native-informant and focus on themes
acceptable to editors in New York City or London. And genre is threaded through this whole
system, demarcating not just what subject matter is permissible but also which authors are
passable: Do they talk in ways that will appeal to elite white readers? Do they present themselves
in ways that are nonthreatening? Because the genres of humanity are deeply sedimented within
societies structured by racial capitalism and settler colonialism, authors’ humanities are also
subject to valuation. This global stratification of value is a primary reason subalternity persists,
because in order to be heard, one’s voice must be first recognized and then assimilated into the
rhetorical space available. This dynamic is especially perilous for writers or nonliterate creators
who occupy the marginalized, forgotten, or plain unknown corners of the “world republic of
letters,” as Spivak has observed in a critique of the global turn in literary studies.43 “Because he
is illiterate, Nimai still sings, but is embarrassed to do so in front of the others. We cannot read
this as ‘subaltern literature.’”44 I explore these points more in the first chapter of this study.

Interlude: Settler Colonialism and Racial Capitalism

This study intentionally engages Black, Indigenous, and people-of-color (BIPOC)
feminist thought, both to counter reflexive academic citation to non-BIPOC thinkers, feminist or
otherwise, and to utilize the rich resources of intersectional thinking and practice. In this regard, I
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now add another prominent Black female thinker to the mix—Janet Jackson—who deployed the
form of the “interlude” on her landmark concept album Rhythm Nation 1814 (1989) to provide
additional commentary to consider alongside the songs. Following this model, I too use the
interlude to impart more context to my main discussions and findings. In this first interlude, I
wish to explicate my understanding of the first conditions, as it were, of global modernity: settler
colonialism and racial capitalism. Like fellow critical ethnic studies scholars,45 I view these
systems as both foundational to the ruling world order and as irreducibly intertwined—indeed, as
co-constituted, like two sides of the same coin. However, although analysis of settler colonialism
and racial capitalism grows all the time, the two concepts are typically treated on their own,
without a holistic explanation of their interworkings. To help suture this scholarly gap, I
designed this study to contribute to the emerging stream of scholarship synthesizing the
collective “relations of conquest,” as Tiffany Lethabo King puts it, ushered in by European
colonization and chattel slavery.46 King means this generative phrase, in its initial and most
important instance, to signify relations between Black peoples and Native peoples brought into
contact with each other in the New World of European creation. But “relations of conquest” can
also signal, secondarily, the entire field of social relations that developed through the “violence
over the land” in the creation of the U.S. nation-state specifically.47 This violence—of the
dispossession of Native life and land through genocide and removal, and the dispossession of
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Black life and labor “in the wake” of trans-Atlantic slavery48—fundamentally configured
normative social relations in the U.S. regardless of the structural positions of the people or
groups relating to one another. Indeed, such violence is the reason for the existence of the nationstate form: to demarcate boundaries between people and resources and to keep those borders
secure through the force of the police (to manage intranational divisions of power) and the
military (to litigate international arrangements of might). The determinative role of state violence
in maintaining these inequalities between various sectors of the “American public” is another
impetus for my focus on “crime” in this study, given the way the police as a function evolved
from both the slave patrol and the colonial militia.49 This deep genealogy as well as the deep
divisions within pluralistic liberal-democratic societies also partially explain why people,
seemingly across identification, reflexively call the police when they have a problem or a
dispute, without realizing—or consciously contending with—the harm such a call sets in motion
for the putative offender. I explore the psychic economy of violence in more detail in each of this
study’s chapters.
King also helpfully sounds an alarm against “scholars [who] ride the newest theoretical
waves of intellectual currency (i.e., White settler colonialism)”—a trend that can reinforce the
“conquistador” order of things and turn analysis into just an accounting of that order, rather than
an opening onto different sets of relations (such as Native-Black encounters) that can point the
way toward or instantiate new modes of collectivity altogether.50 I understand this concern to
mean, in part, that Black studies and Indigenous studies must be the terrain upon which to
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institute a thoroughgoing disarmament of Western thought and its gerrymandering logic (the
knowledge apparatus) and not simply temporary stations from which to launch passing critiques
of settler colonialism—and its fraternal twin, racial capitalism. I aim to participate in this project
of anti-violent worldmaking in a number of ways, not least through the methods I engage in this
study (which I detail in the next section). But these methods support my overriding mission as an
academic, which is to hasten the end of settler colonialism and racial capitalism. The only way I
know how to do that is to understand them better so as to identify more strategies for taking them
apart. My success in this regard depends entirely on my interlocutors, both those whom I know
personally and those—many more—whom I know only through their writing and thought. My
responsibility is to them: how I hear them, how I engage them, how I pursue my own work in the
wake of their work. Indeed, one of the permutations of “the wake” that Christina Sharpe has
theorized is care.51 I hope that I have cared for the work of others in this work of mine in the
ways they would want me to.
Black studies and Indigenous studies together have taught me not just about settler
colonialism and racial capitalism but also about the world, and part of what I hope to do in this
manuscript is to use these fields of study to further map how the ongoing dispossession of
Indigenous peoples and Black peoples—and of Brown peoples and Asian peoples—is managed
at global scale. If Black studies and Indigenous studies have largely taken North America as case
study, befitting the continent’s disproportionate influence in planetary matters, then in Original
Gangsters I aim to expand the terrain of these fields of study to southern Africa and South Asia,
joining the insights of North American scholars with those of academics in the so-called Global
South. My approach in this regard has necessarily required me to rethink dominant scholarly
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understandings of colonialism, capitalism, indigeneity, and race that consider their impacts not
just in North American but around the world and over time. By way of example, take the
question of what kind of colonialism South Asia experienced. Traditionally, the subcontinent has
been thought of as a site of indirect colonialism, meaning there was a minimal British presence
and no widespread genocide (although there was—and continues to be—a certain degree of
assimilation among the most educated, wealthiest sectors of the population). On this basis, South
Asia could not have experienced settler colonialism, at least not according to the terms of a
hallmark of settler-colonial studies, Patrick Wolfe’s 2006 article “Settler Colonialism and the
Elimination of the Native,” in which the late Australian elaborated his title’s claim, that
genocide—“the elimination of the Native”—defines settler colonialism.52 However, while South
Asian peoples mostly escaped population genocide, their diverse political, economic, and social
arrangements were largely settled—that is, eliminated—and replaced with British systems. These
systems settled further after the Indian partition of 1947, as the “postcolonial” nation-states of
India, Pakistan, and, later, Bangladesh, became dependent on global financial institutions such as
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in order to develop their economies
according to the demands of the advanced industrial nation-states of the Global North. Along
with the World Trade Organization, the International Court of Justice, and the United Nations (in
its manifold iterations), these institutions and their powerful backers have effectively settled the
economic, juridical, and political systems of the “poorer nations” of the world, as Vijay Prashad
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has accessibly shown.53 Meanwhile, the Indian state continues to formally dispossess Indigenous
peoples of their land, to which Mahasweta Devi and Arundhati Roy (among many others) have
directed attention, and the state has also sought to (further) settle offshore lands, such as the
Andaman Islands, site of the former British-colonial carceral facility known as the Cellular Jail.54
Settler colonialism also characterizes South Africa,55 as I demonstrate extensively in Chapter
Two of this study, and the U.S.—the two other nation-states that inform this study. All three are
also liberal democracies with, perforce, racial-capitalist political economies. Altogether, the
material and conceptual traffic between liberal democracy, settler colonialism, and racial
capitalism—a three-headed circuit that emerged in and through the triangular trade—constitutes
the primary undertone of this dissertation, to be built out and brought to the fore for the book
version.

Specific Interventions and Methodology

The geographical and conceptual locations I trace above are starkly different from those
commonly taken as the starting point for the gangster genre, which is axiomatically understood
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to depict turf wars between white communities in Italy or the United States. In this origin story,
the Sicilian mafia emerged in the late 18th century and early 19th century, followed by the
emigration of representatives of those “crime” families to the United States, where their
enterprises gained new horizons thanks to the American dream of economic, class, and racial
mobility for white-ethnic immigrants during and after the Ellis Island period of U.S.
immigration. This narrative was enshrined in The Godfather Part II (1974), both a prequel and a
sequel to 1972’s The Godfather. Cultural critics have understood the works as a two-part ars
poetica, if you will, for the gangster genre.
However, if such critics zoomed out to a larger geography during the Industrial
Revolution in Europe and the U.S. and accounted for the political economic conditions of people
in other areas of the world at that same time, they would see that just as Sicilians and other
residents of what would become southern Italy battled economic and political exclusion from
structures of power dominated by the technologically advanced north, so too did the Indigenous
peoples of what would become India (and Pakistan, and Bangladesh) contest their similar
removal from the levers of authority. And this was even worse because of the way they were
deemed not just not advanced but backwards, and often criminally so. In other words, both
southern Europeans and global southerners found themselves locked out of the dominant
political economic structures set by their northern counterparts. Although the subalterns of protoItaly, as Gramsci wrote, faced a kind of internal colonialism, while the subalterns of South Asia
faced the external colonialism of imperial Britain, both classes—genres—of people were deemed
criminal if they contested their oppression, generating the now globally known words and
concepts of the “mafia” and the “thug” respectively. This geographic and political relocation of
the gangster’s origin away from the myth of its origin is the first intervention of my project.
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My second intervention, building upon the preceding one, theorizes how the myth of the
gangster’s U.S. origin became a global truth. Following the British empire’s appropriation of
Indigenous land and lives to create settler-colonial societies in North America, South Asia, and
Africa, I argue that the mass-entertainment industries in each of these ostensibly postcolonial
regions appropriate the self and collective representations of Indigenous and racialized people
and revise them to suit the disciplinary aims of nation-states. This sleight of hand is clear in
comparisons between dominant U.S. gangster productions (such as The Godfather or The
Sopranos) and subaltern gangster productions in India, South Africa, or the U.S. In the former
entertainments, the primary narrative is about white ethnics largely skirting the law while
operating lucrative informal companies. In the latter cases, by contrast, the main story is of
Indigenous and racialized people contesting the law through survival economies and politics—
and being punished, often mortally, for their challenges. This split can be seen even in widely
popular forms such as gangsta rap, still generically understood, including by many of its creators
(as heard in their lyrical allusions), as a copy of white arrivant56 gangster style. Never mind that
Indigenous and racialized people in the Americas, the origin of gangsta rap, were subject to the
crimes of settler colonialism and racial capitalism in the founding of these continents’ societies
and remain disproportionately criminalized (as pointed out by some niche gangsta MCs).
In my final intervention, then, I posit that mystifying the origins of social and
entertainment genres is the work of genre: an ancillary process to gender and race (the
etymological synonyms of genre) that similarly distorts relations between people, between
people and structures, and between people and commodities. In other words, genre does the
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narrative work necessary to uphold heteropatriarchy, settler colonialism, racial capitalism,
ableism, and the other axes of oppression undergirding empire. And like the notion of distinct
genders and races, the notion of distinct genres is an original fiction of empire’s architects.
Indeed, just as genus classifies flora and fauna and gender divides people by presumed sex—
distinctions made according to a European system of meaning—genre arranges human fauna on
a spectrum of value, with Indigenous and racialized people represented as savage, wild,
backwards, criminal, unhuman, while Europeans and Euro-Americans are considered civilized,
self-possessed, enlightened, moral, human. In flattening vast heterogeneities of peoples, cultures,
and ways of being and thinking into monoliths of difference to maintain longstanding power
structures, genre is a critical but under-studied linchpin in regulating access to the institutions
and resources of liberal-democratic nation-states in both the global north and south.
Moreover, the production of genres as economic products by mass-entertainment
industries complements the production of political products by liberal-democratic governments,
so that media representations about marginalized groups of people in service to box-office
returns bolster the representations made about those communities in service to policymaking
(and vice versa). This two-fold logic of representation, I contend, emerged out of the need for
imperial actors to justify to national audiences their conquest and exploitation of Indigenous
peoples and lands: a bifurcated governing process based not on self- and collective
representation (direct rule) but on representation by others (indirect rule). Through U.S.
independence, this system became known as representative democracy, which I call settler
democracy to emphasize the enduring context of settler colonialism; eventually it became the
norm for global governance, political economy, and liberal nation-states across the world.
Altogether, the multiple types of indirect representations across the field of liberal society enact
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multiple violences against Indigenous and racialized people, even as liberal institutions
continually enshrine the truisms of equality before the law and freedom for all. Indeed, as all the
subaltern works I examine in the ensuing pages suggest, “crime” is itself a production of genre: a
narrative about people and power that constantly muddles the protagonists and antagonists. This
confused story is never more evident than when the beneficiaries of the settler state and racial
capital, working through the panoply of liberal institutions, project their own crimes on to
anyone who tries to undermine their power or seeks change.
This set of interventions proceeds from the methodology I employed in this study, which
ranged from archival research on multiple continents to close readings of literary, film,
television, and music texts to the synthesis and analysis of core theoretical ideas from both
contemporary and quintessential thinkers in the fields of Black studies, postcolonial studies,
Indigenous studies, American studies, and critical ethnic studies. Moreover, I innovated an
overall project design that features three case studies set in ostensibly postcolonial cities that
serve as national financial capitals and global hubs for capital, people, and movement. Mumbai,
Johannesburg, and New York are also on three different continents, giving my project a global
reach that matches my investigation of globality itself. Within this design, each case study hones
in on the local circumstances informing the production of gangsterism as an entertainment genre,
and how these metropolitan, in-country dynamics connect with issues of global governance,
political economy, and social relations. Moreover, each case study focuses on a distinct
entertainment medium alongside a specific liberal-democratic institution: for Mumbai, gangster
films in relationship to the Indian state and its actors; for Johannesburg, a gangster TV series
produced by the state broadcaster (in collaboration with a prominent NGO); and for New York,
gangsta rap (specifically, trap music) in association with the mainstream music industry.
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Each case study further distinguished by the amount of archival research I’ve been able to
do for it to date. Since Indian gangster films sparked the project, I first conducted exploratory
research in Indian archives, mainly the National Film Archive of India in Pune, when I had the
chance in the summer of 2014, courtesy of a one-time open-ended grant from my graduate
school. Subsequently, the school offered archival-research grants bounded by the fields of
American studies, African-American studies, and African-diaspora studies; in this fashion, I
received two grants to conduct significant research in South African archives in the summers of
2015 and 2016, primarily in the Historical Papers holdings of Johannesburg’s University of the
Witwatersrand. As such, my Johannesburg-set chapter is grounded in archival research, while
my Mumbai-set chapter uses it sparingly (although it shaped my entire project). By contrast, my
New York-set chapter doesn’t use archival research at all—at least not my own, given that the
chapter depends in substantial part on the archival research Hartman did for Scenes of
Subjection. I am grateful to her for this original work that has made my own work possible.
I also wish to reflect for a moment on my own positionality and ethical responsibility in
relation to the questions at hand in this study. First and foremost, as a white-, cisgender-, maleidentified observer and analyst, my arguments and findings here have a better chance of
circulating and gaining influence than work by thinkers on similar topics who are not white-,
cisgender-, and male-identified. This structural inequity in scholarly and mainstream citational
economies inspired the Critical Ethnic Studies journal to issue, in 2015, a “Citation Practices
Challenge” as a way of countering the status quo.57 Indeed, the journal’s invitation to
contemplate questions of citational politics such as “Who do you choose to link and re-circulate
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in your work? Who gets erased? Who should you stop citing?” was based in part on Sara
Ahmed’s observation that citation is a “rather successful reproductive technology, a way of
reproducing the world around certain bodies.”58 As such, the textual system of scholarly
reference—in its normative, unquestioned operation—bolsters the reproduction of the material
world in unchanging ways. To interrupt this citational economy in solidarity with other critical
ethnic studies scholars—and with movements on the ground also working to conjure a different
future—I have actively sought not just to cite Black, Indigenous, and people of color (BIPOC)
throughout this study but to also think with them as much as possible. This attempt at collective
thinking across racialized boundaries has necessitated a concurrent practice of self-reflection for
me so that I can take the proper care required in thinking with other people, especially when we
occupy different positionalities, racial, gendered, or otherwise.59

Chapter Outline

The first chapter, “Gangster Theory: Relocating a Genre, Rethinking the Role of Genre,”
continues my re-reading of the gangster genre and its history by revisiting original subaltern
rebellions and their historiography and then comparing them to dominant Anglophone depictions
of “crime” and gangsterism in India today that promulgate a rule of law from the global North,
such as Slumdog Millionaire (2008) and, especially, the 2012 English-language novel Narcopolis
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by the Indian writer Jeet Thayil. I next expose the fictions of these portrayals through a close
reading of two films by the maverick Hindi- and Telugu-language director Ram Gopal Varma—
Satya (1998) and Sarkar (2005), the latter a deconstruction of The Godfather—which highlight
both the embattled conditions in which masses of Indians live and the perpetual collaboration
between the news media, the police, and elected leaders to secure the settler state’s monopoly on
violence.
The second chapter, “‘Crime Must be Criminalised’: South Africa, Transitional Justice,
and Post-Apartheid Imaginaries of Reform and Change,” takes up the question of “crime”
control and prevention in post-apartheid South Africa as the new democratic state sought to meet
global demands for political, economic, and social development in order to receive both foreign
aid and multi-national financial investment. I first examine globally circulating literary
representations of contemporary South Africa and ask whether their persistent focus on “crime”
and violence obscures the historical crime and violence of apartheid. I then find a parallel to this
tension in a pair of television series. I uncovered the first, East Side (1999), in my research in the
Historical Papers archive of Johannesburg’s University of the Witwatersrand. Produced in a
collaboration between the NGO the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation and the
state-operated South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), the show was set in an
integrating Johannesburg high school and was meant to educate white viewers about
multiculturalism and the need to accept Black people as equals rather than as inferiors. The
SABC, however, followed this program with its own series, Yizo Yizo (2001), set in a Soweto
high school, in which the multicultural focus was replaced with one on gangs and “crime”—a
rescripting I read as an effort to discipline Black viewers into an upwardly mobile/respectability
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ideology while confirming white viewers’ prejudices. I then turn to issues of reception, praxis,
and the continuing vexations of the South African “transformation.”
The third and final chapter, “Trap Spaces, Trap Labor: Emancipation, the Carceral State,
and Trap Music,” considers the politics of the gangsta-rap subgenre of trap music amid hip hop’s
continuing growth as a dominant genre on the one hand and the enveloping reach of the prisonindustrial complex on the other. Building upon both Saidiya Hartman’s analysis of the burdened
self-possession of Black people in the U.S. post-emancipation and Beth Richie’s theory of
the gender entrapment of Black women, I explore the informal political interventions of rap artist
Fetty Wap’s 2014 song and music video “Trap Queen.” I first trace a genealogy of “trap” that
emphasizes the continuity of containment and constrained choices for putatively free Black
people in both the antebellum and post-bellum eras. I then think specifically about the genre of
trap music as a key form of contemporary Black popular culture, of which “Trap Queen” is a
milestone for mainstream visibility. Finally, I consider the excess of the song and video’s liberal
heteropatriachal vision: the issues of gender entrapment and violence against Black women, the
disappearance of which illustrates the larger fictions of freedom in the afterlife of slavery.
I conclude the study with a meditation on how to transform or undo the metaphysics of
genre and, therefore, “crime.” Titled “Toward a Nongrammatical Relationality (and an End to
Violence),” in this coda I freely speculate on how to break the subject-object bind of liberaldemocratic grammar through transdisciplinary cultural work that requires movement, an action
that the term “coda” reinforces. Toni Morrison depicts this subject-object bind in the prologue to
her 1973 novel Sula, a tour de force that I’m teaching for the fourth or fifth time as I write these
last words, here and elsewhere in the manuscript. In her portrayal, the persistence of racial
inequality fundamentally depends on a false representation of freedom premised upon deceptive
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socio-spatial relations: a “slave” is granted his freedom through the trickery of his master, who
conditions the freedom on his chattel’s receipt of infertile land that has been represented as
fertile. If, as Morrison’s example demonstrates, representation means the re-presentation of
factual reality for a subject’s profit and an object’s loss, then perhaps refusing representation
might unlock a different set of relations to both space and each other that is not dependent on
subjects or objects. To consider these possibilities, I attend to the world-making of artist Simone
Leigh, who creates assemblages of sculptural form that revise European precedents through
African-diasporic cultural practices. In effect, these assemblages compel the moving, viewing
subject into a different relationality with the presumably fixed, unseeing object before them—for
Leigh’s sculptures exert a hold on the bodies that encounter them such that the grammar of the
hold might finally be contained.
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CHAPTER ONE

Gangster Theory: Relocating a Genre, Rethinking the Role of Genre

When a peasant rose in revolt at any time or place under the Raj, he did so necessarily
and explicitly in violation of a series of codes which defined his very existence as a
member of that colonial, and still largely semi-feudal society. For his subalternity was
materialized by the structure of property, institutionalized by law, sanctified by religion
and made tolerable—and even desirable—by tradition. To rebel was indeed to destroy
many of those familiar signs which he had learned to read and manipulate in order to
extract meaning out of the harsh world around him and live with it. The risk in “turning
things upside down” under these conditions was indeed so great that he could hardly
afford to engage in such a project in a state of absent-mindedness.
—Ranajit Guha (1983)
In a world that has really been turned upside down, the true is a moment of the false.
—Guy Debord (1967; emphasis his)
Bombay is often called Mayapuri, the city of maya—of illusion.
—Amrit Gangar (1995)

The 1998 Indian gangster film Satya tells the story of a migrant worker named Satya who
arrives in Mumbai alone and falls into a complex patronage ring shaped by the shifting
allegiances and contingencies of a gang leader and an elected official. The police are on to both
the gangster and the politician but are powerless to stop their actions, which include the murder
of a movie director who isn’t following the approved script. In the course of Satya’s plot, Satya
ascends from tending bar at an adult-entertainment establishment to being a top gang enforcer in
his own right, ultimately killing the politician before Satya himself is killed by the police. The
initial film in maverick director Ram Gopal Varma’s lauded Hindi-language gangster trilogy,
Satya tells two intertwined stories: the first about the changed political economy in India some
50 years after independence, and what it takes for an individual to rise from poverty to the plenty
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of government corruption and black-market profit; and the second about the mediation of reality
by dominant political actors in both the formal and informal governance sectors, in which the
representations of filmmaking are deployed for particular ends.
Indeed, “Satya,” transliterated from the Hindi, means “truth,” and so the story of Satya
the character is also the story of truth, as it were. As Satya negotiates his way through a maze of
money, power, and violence, we as viewers are meant to see the truths that are shaped for us by
real-world actors in multiple contexts of representation that are backed by violence, chief among
them media representations and governmental representations—that is, representations made by
the putative representatives of “the people,” that vague grouping always outside the frame of
Varma’s camera. Like the U.S.’s Quentin Tarantino, Varma exposes not just the routine violence
that exists in liberal-democratic societies but the media’s role historically and presently in
forming both influential depictions of that violence—for starters, who is shown to inflict
violence and who isn’t—and the outcomes of that violence: the generic baggage that sticks to
real-life people like a second skin. In the hands of another director, for instance, Satya could’ve
been represented as a migrant who commits “crime” because he doesn’t have the work ethic to
get a normal job, and the machinations of the political bosses—that is, the gangster and the
politician—would be unseen. Instead, Varma depicts the curtailed options for employment in
highly stratified societies like India’s (and those of the two other sites of this study, South Africa
and the U.S.) while also exposing the collaboration between various institutions of liberal
democracy—here the media, elected government, and the police—to maintain the status quo.
Needless to say, Satya is not the generic narrative about the so-called Indian
“underworld” offered to Anglophone audiences worldwide by gatekeepers in the film and
literary industries, whether in blockbuster movies such as Slumdog Millionaire (2008) or in more
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rarified treatments such as Jeet Thayil’s 2012 novel Narcopolis, both of which obscure the
material conditions for impoverished urban dwellers in favor of an exceptionalist portrait and a
tragic one, respectively. Nor does Satya’s portrayal of gangsterism conform to the paradigm set
by The Godfather and elaborated in The Godfather Part II and then in Martin Scorsese’s wellknown contributions to the genre (such as 1990’s Goodfellas) and culminating in the HBO series
The Sopranos (1999-2007), often lauded as the best television show ever just as The Godfather
has enjoyed a reputation as the best film of all time. In none of these entertainments are the
large-scale political economic structures—nor their agents—portrayed. At best, the U.S.
examples are sometimes understood as parables of corporate America, while, at worst, the
Indian-set examples (distributed to audiences with U.S. capital) confirm the ongoing stigma of
“crime” attached to non-white foreigners who are also poor—that is, people who do not meet the
standards of Wynter’s homo oeconomicus or Silva’s homo modernus.
In what follows, I start at the beginning: the beginning of this study overall, and the
beginning of the Indian “gangster” genre: the rebellion of Indian peoples against British
settlement from the mid-18th century onward. I next review the contemporary history of
gangsters in Mumbai as a back story to both Satya and Narcopolis, after which I explore the
latter’s depiction of gangsters. I conclude with an analysis of Sarkar, Varma’s 2005 “tribute” to
The Godfather,1 which heightens the salient differences between the Indian gangster genre as
apotheosized by Sarkar and the Euro-American gangster genre as epitomized by The Godfather.
Indeed, Sarkar takes Varma’s filmic critique of politics, truth, and lies to the next level, insofar
as it initiated what the filmmaker has called a political trilogy, whereas Satya began his gangster
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trilogy. By elevating the Indian gangster film to a political drama about competing visions of the
rule of law, Varma helps show how apolitical the Euro-American gangster film is: a genre
ultimately about struggles between “crime” families and over family succession. By contrast,
Sarkar makes clear that the ruse of “crime” is used by the Indian settler state to neutralize and
mystify insurgencies against the state’s monopoly on violence, just as earlier Indian peoples
revolted against the imposition of Britain’s rule of law, backed by the empire’s own sovereign
violence.
Moreover, the fictions purveyed by globally circulating English-language novels like
Narcopolis, which feigns realism in order to peddle what Euro-American readers think they
known about “crime,” particularly as it plays out among the darker peoples of the world, work
against the truths of Indigenous or autochthonous narratives and their circulations globally. As I
have argued previously, if outsiders really want to understand events and their significance in a
given geopolitical space, they/we must look at what artists and creatives are producing for their
own communities and not for the “global” community.2 “Global” in this usage is simply a
euphemism for “settler-colonial” or “neo-imperial”—enduring systems of forced and exploited
exchange in service to the maintenance of the Global North’s power across multiple dimensions.
And one of the techniques for securing this power, as ever, is the trading in of self- and
collectively authorized expressions of lived experiences from the Global South for
representations of those lived experiences by others: that is, by actors in the Global North.
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Interlude: Euro-American Centrism

Throughout the years of this study’s development, whenever I told people I was
researching global gangster culture, they typically responded with a variation of, “You mean like
The Godfather?” The example might be The Sopranos, or Goodfellas, maybe Scarface (the 1983
Al Pacino version, not the 1932 original), but inevitably, regardless of where I was in the world,
the citation was to Hollywood’s long production of the gangster genre. This reception didn’t
surprise me in the United States, but it did when I was in India or South Africa, the two other
British post-colonies that inform my argument about the meaning and history of “gangsterism”
over the long durée of colonial, postcolonial, and global modernity. While all three nation-states
are linked by their mutual imperial heritage, sizable English-speaking markets, and the reach of
the U.S. culture industry, they’re nevertheless quite different in many ways.
Classic cultural-studies theory teaches that genres emerge in and are continually shaped
by specific political, historical, social, and economic circumstances.3 So, when I encountered the
idea, implicitly or explicitly, that an expression of gangster culture in one part of the world is the
same as such an expression elsewhere, I was always bemused. How could they be the same given
the histories of disparate regions and their exchanges through trade, movement, and empire?
Why do people, inside and outside the academy, think that genres—representational
taxonomies—are static over time and place? What are the practical, “real-world” implications of
this assumption? And how can this Euro-American centrism be revoked?
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In this chapter marked by revision and associated “re” actions—relocating a genre,
rethinking the rule of law, and so on—I want to start by reviewing the genesis of this study and
my own revisions to some of my original premises. This project began in a course on
postcolonial urban studies in which I saw my first non-U.S. gangster production: Satya. The
scholarship we read in connection with the film struck me as misplaced, literally: it deployed
European assumptions about the underworld and “crime” to explain a South Asian story—
presuming, implicitly, that all gangster narratives are the same because of the conforming effects
of a globalization that only goes one way: from a European origin forward in time and radial in
space.4 Other scholars, meanwhile, have shown how the representational category of noir—the
“dark” form—is originally a colonial production.5
And yet the notion of the U.S. as the original context for the gangster genre persists, not
just in the scant scholarship on the form but also in transnational reception histories, as I saw
first-hand in the National Film Archive of India in 2014 while reading back issues of Filmfare, a
Bollywood glossy catering to elite Anglophone Indians.6 Indeed, in the 1970s, when the Indian
economy liberalized and U.S. movies entered the market like never before, Filmfare’s writers
and readers (the latter evidenced by their letters to the editor) consistently worried that
Bollywood productions, including gangster films, were mere copies of U.S. exports: plagiarized
versions of narrative types from elsewhere.7 At the same time, however, professional Indian
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cineastes also recognized the unique qualities of their ostensibly homegrown films. As a 1987
Filmfare article described the angry young man genre, films like Zanjeer (1973) and Deewaar
(1975) “established an archetype peculiar to the Indian audience: the die-hard rebel, who rose,
seething in anger against a cold-blooded establishment, and razed it to the ground in a climactic
outburst of violence.”8 Referring to Bachchan’s portrayal of this archetype, the unnamed writer
went on to state that the “vehemence and conviction with which Amitabh essayed it, evoked
instant empathy. Unlike the earlier heroes, Amitabh was not always a paragon of virtue in his
films. Often, his hands were unclean… he took the law into his own hands… resorted to violence
to achieve his end! This aspect of his character is what made the identification complete…”9
Although the author didn’t specify who identified with whom, the implication is that sectors of
the Indian audience connected with the use of violence by Bachchan’s characters: the angry
young men who “took the law into [their] own hands.” If this sovereign use of violence detracted
from his characters’ “virtue,” the Filmfare writer doesn’t fault Bachchan’s portrayal or the
scripts’ characterization. Instead, the writer recognized that Bachchan and the roles he performed
on screen gave expression to significant public sentiment: the conflicts of his characters
“overwhelmingly social” compared to the “romantic” contexts of Indian leading men of the
1950s and ’60s. Bachchan’s characters “demonstrated, protested and refused to accept the power
structure, attacked institutional hypocrisy and social inequality. In a way he emphasised the
moral dilemma of the 70s.”10
In many way, the “moral dilemma of the ’70s” is still with us today: namely, the advent
of neoliberalism and its ultra laissez faire political economy, which coupled market deregulation
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and cuts to social services in the global North (think the Reagan and Thatcher administrations)
alongside international demands for newly independent countries of the global South to privatize
publicly owned utilities, introduce fiscal austerity to their ostensibly bloated economies, and
open their domestic markets to direct foreign investment. Meanwhile, as populations in both the
North and the South fought such structural adjustment, the rule of law was strengthened to
combat public protests and disincentivize more voices from speaking out. One of the chief
measures for enhancing the power of the state in this was the state of emergency, such as the one
declared by then Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1975 in response to opposition to both
her government’s corruption and its failure to deal effectively with a depressed economy due in
part to the 1973 oil crisis—the same trigger that allowed the center-right in the U.S. to usher in
neoliberalism in that country, starting with New York City. Indeed, 1975 was when then U.S.
president Gerald Ford famously denied the city any federal assistance to stave off the
municipality’s looming bankruptcy, a context I examine more in the third chapter of this study.
1975 was also the year of the Soweto uprising in South Africa, during which the apartheid
government allowed the police to shoot and kill school children and their teachers.
When I first began the thinking, seven years ago, that led to this dissertation, Giorgio
Agamben’s theory of the state of exception was in vogue. But as critics of his deracinated view
of the rule of law pointed out, Black people and racialized peoples in general have always lived
under a state of exception, in which, on the one hand, their rights as citizens under national law
or humans under international law are routinely violated: the exception that proves the rule that
only Wynter’s homo oeconomicus and his nuclear family enjoy the protection of the state. On
the other hand, normative theories of the state of exception and the kindred concepts of bare life
and biopolitics are incapable of apprehending “modes of life alongside the violence, subjection,
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exploitation, and racialization that define” global modernity.11 Nevertheless, in spite of these
flaws, Agamben’s work was put to use by a variety of scholars, including Jean and John
Comaroff, who cited him in the introduction to their 2006 edited volume Law and Disorder in
the Postcolony to make one of their central points: that “the relative ease with which autocracies
have made the transition to constitutional democracy points toward the possibility that they”—
autocracies and democracies—“share more mechanisms of governance than has conventionally
been recognized, not least their grounding in a rule of law…predicated on sovereign violence.”12
And yet the remainder of their introduction—as well as the essays in the collection—were
dedicated to elaborating another point: that democratization in postcolonial spaces had unleashed
a wellspring of lawlessness. The Comaroffs explained this apparent dynamic as follows:
[R]ising criminality in postcolonies is not simply a reflex, antisocial response to poverty
or joblessness, scarcity, or other effects of structural adjustment, important though these
things are….It is part of a much more troubled dialectic: a dialectic of law and dis/order,
framed by neoliberal mechanisms of deregulation and new modes of mediating human
transactions at once politico-economic and cultural, moral, and mortal. Under such
conditions[,] criminal violence does not so much repudiate the rule of law or the licit
operations of the market as appropriate their forms—and recommission their substance.13
In this account, structural adjustment and other reforms, both economic and political, exacted
from postcolonial nation-states by the “United States of Europe” (in Spivak’s indelible phrase14),
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had created such a degree of privation in many countries of the so-called global South that
impoverished people often had no choice but to turn to what is normatively understood as
“crime.” This compulsion, I averred, had as much do with the psychic pleasures of expenditure
as it did with the need to gain material resources for the reproduction of one’s life (or of a
family’s life), as Achille Mbembe theorized in his contribution to the Comaroffs’ collection.15
And yet I realize now that “crime” and violence have been methods have the prefix “neo”
did too much work in this account, because these issues, rather than obtaining in a distinctly
postcolonial context, have been part of the colonial context from the start. Indeed, the colonial
context might be said to be a criminal one. In other words, the rule of law—that is, the state’s
monopoly on violence—must be reconsidered as an irreducible aspect of sovereignty—indeed,
its raison d’etre.

Reconsidering the Spectacle

It may seem strange to introduce Debord’s concept of the spectacle at this point, but
that’s what I’m going to do. At its most basic level, the spectacle is the “visual reflection of the
ruling economic order.”16 But if visible violence—the spectacle—both confirms the invisible
violence of the global market and supplants it (as either an autonomous or cultural production),
then where we see violence we must at the same time see the political economy that produces the
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violence. This, then, is the significance of my epigraph from Debord: the true—here, social
violence—must be seen as the false, while the false—politico-economic violence—must be seen
as the true. Capitalism has turned the world so “upside down” that we have to consider any
spectacle to be the opposite of its normative interpretation. And this applies to spectacles in
public space, where social violence—and suffering—takes place, as well as to spectacles that
represent such spectacles, as in the case of media productions: film, TV, books, and the
press/infotainment sphere. We also need to see these spectacles not as representations of life but
as the “negation of life—a negation of life that has taken on a visible form.”17 In other words,
critical practice concerning the spectacle must both see it as a representation of capital and as a
concomitant erasure of life. In essence, life becomes “mere images” that depict “a world that can
no longer directly be grasped,”18 and our understanding of the totality, and social relations within
it, are mediated by these images.
Debord makes one more point about the spectacle that facilitates my aims in this chapter:
that the critique of spectacle, and the destruction of societies based on it—which at this juncture
might well be called the world order—must proceed by “the theory of its real conditions—the
concrete conditions of present-day oppression”—only in this way can there be a “resumption of
revolutionary class struggle.”19 Thus, in the context of “crime”—or, more accurately,
criminalization—we need always to attend, simultaneously, to both the discursive moves of
power—order vs. disorder, legal vs. illegal/criminal—and the material realities produced by
these moves. If Bombay is the “city of illusion,” as my epigraph from Amrit Gangar has it, what
illusions are true, and what are false?
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Spectacles of Capital I: The Political Economy of Violence

In this section I want to think through the ways in which capital has been deployed in
Mumbai, India’s commercial and entertainment capital and also the capital of Maharashtra state.
The name Mumbai—the vernacular pronunciation of Bombay in Marathi, the official language
of Maharashtra—itself is an important illusion of capital, the result of a concerted effort by
Maratha-Hindu nationalists to inscribe the city for their own political-economic purposes. And
this effort, waged particularly by the Shiv Sena, a nativist movement active since the mid-1960s,
was conducted largely in the public spaces of the city, often through spectacles of violence
orchestrated by informal networks that remained outside the law as such. Indeed, the “de facto
legal impunity” that the Shiv Sena enjoyed produced a “concomitant fear of the movement
among its adversaries and victims,” as Thomas Blom Hansen notes.20
Shiv Sena took shape in 1966 in response to Bombay’s emergence as India’s preeminent
site of capital accumulation. According to Hansen, the city’s population doubled from the turn of
the 20th century to 1941, and then exceeded that rate in the 20 years after independence, reaching
six million in 1971. These new laborers, in turn, expanded Bombay’s economy, adding “machine
manufacturing, chemical industry, shipbuilding, electrical engineering, and many other heavy
and technically advanced industries” to its previous strengths in textiles and consumer goods.21
But after the formation of Maharashtra in 1960, calls came to spread these economic gains across
the state; at the same time, Marathi-speaking arrivals to the city “found themselves at the lower
rungs of the labor market and in competition with skilled or specialized communities from other
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parts of India,” such as “Muslim weavers from North India or literate South Indians whose skills
in English gave them easier access to clerical jobs.”22 Out of this labor competition grew a
Maratha nationalism that blamed “aliens” to Bombay for the lack of jobs.23 Shiv Sena found its
raison d’être in this tension.
Jayant Lele refines this point, stating that Shiv Sena’s original mandate was to preserve
jobs for the Maratha in the “lower echelons of white-collar employment,” particularly the clerical
jobs that Hansen cites but also “lower management jobs,” which similarly required Englishlanguage ability.24 The South Indians in these positions were amplified by their numbers in
Bombay’s journalism, culture, and education sectors. Thus, by 1966, 19 years after
independence, English, the language of both the former colonizer and the city’s elite, was pitted
against Marathi, the language of the Maratha, who were now claiming Bombay as their own.
Accordingly, English-proficient professionals “became the prime target of Sena attacks,” Lele
writes.25
What interests me here is how the uneven development of capital in Bombay, benefitting
some but certainly not all of the city’s changing cast of inhabitants, led to a cultural nationalism
that was then exploited for political ends. If Bombay became a center of capitalist production for
political-economic reasons, not least the British empire’s economic interests, carried forward by
English-speaking Indian elites, then those left out of that capital expansion had identifiable
figures to blame—that is, scapegoat. The Shiv Sena exploited this opportunity instead of
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assailing the “dominance of capital over Bombay,” a dominance whose consolidation over time
would create more tension for Shiv Sena to leverage divisively.26 This dominance, of course, was
facilitated by the state of Maharashtra, and at the behest of the national government. Indian
political leaders at first resisted incorporating Bombay into the new Maharashtra state out of
concern that capitalist production in the city, largely financed by Gujarati interests, wouldn’t be
sufficiently “safeguarded” in the face of strong rural Maratha agricultural interests.27 Having
overcome this resistance, though, the Maharashtra Congress Party gave capital “free rein” in
Bombay, in contrast to other Indian cities “where state enterprises came to dominate” the local
economies.28 This laissez-faire political economy also spurred a highly speculative casino
capitalism,29 particularly evident in the real-estate market, which Arjun Appadurai has called the
“spectrality in Bombay’s housing scene.”30
Altogether, the Maharashtra state’s regulatory abdication had three primary effects: an
ever-increasing polarization of wealth and poverty; a so-called “underworld,” or informal
capitalist sector, of “crime” and other practices that took advantage of that polarization; and the
inability of the state to intervene in either the formal economy or the cultural responses to it.31 To
take the first result, by 1965, there were more than 3000 informal residential settlements in
Bombay, with a “total population of slum and pavement dwellers of more than a million.”32 In
contrast, those with means were already sequestering themselves from the ostensibly public
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spaces of the city, while those between the rich and the poor, namely the lower middle class and
the working class, had entered a kind of permanent precarity, with uncertain job security and
“the declining purchasing power of their incomes.”33 These groups, along with informal
settlement residents and the Marathi-speaking professionals excluded from the white-collar labor
market, became the Shiv Sena’s main constituency.
Concurrently, the informal economy that was developing in connection with the formal
one provided opportunities for material gain. The group had ready workers among “unemployed
and underemployed youth,” who, in lieu of “legitimate” wages, could earn money “through the
collective action of rioting, looting, and extortion.”34 Indeed, by the end of the 1960s, the Sena
leadership and its young male foot soldiers, known as sainiks, had “forged complex links
between the two poles of the emerging capitalist nexus and profited from” them.35 Specifically,
through a strategy of both “collaboration with and coercion of” the profiteers of Bombay’s
formal and informal economies alike—the “big and small industrial capitalists and service- and
film-industry magnates” of the former, and the “builders, importers, exporters, smugglers, drug
pushers, [and] bootleggers” of the latter—the Sena and those in its employ profited.36
The Sena also appealed to these young men because of its “public assertion of
masculine/martial values,”37 reflecting the heteropatriarchal dimension of settler societies. One
aspect of this masculinism is a kind of heteropatriarchy known as “dadaism,” in which men
operate “as protectors, brokers, and providers of services, jobs, and opportunities” due to their
connections with politicians and other institutional actors. The dada, Hindi for grandfather, is a

33

Lele, 192–193.
Lele, 195, 199.
35
Lele, 199.
36
Lele, 199.
37
Hansen, 53.
34

Kennedy

52

familial authority figure that younger men can emulate. The dada model “positions the young
man…as a protector of his family and kin, of women in particular, and as a man of honor who
may be trusted by those who are loyal as much as feared if he is betrayed.”38 This affective
conjunction is further inculcated in male social spaces such as the Mitra Mandals, or Friends
Associations, and gyms and body-building clubs.39
The Sena not only participated in this masculinist culture but leveraged it politically. In
interviews Hansen did with sainiks in 1992-93, he asked “what had attracted them” to the group,
and in “virtually all cases the answers ranged from ‘its aggressiveness’ to ‘its straightforward
language’ to ‘Shiv Sena is more attacking.’”40 This aggressiveness also played off an ideology of
“Maratha bravery” that, in combination with economic inequity, transformed a sense of
“marginalization into a sense of power and potency.”41 And with structural adjustment taking
hold in the 1980s and opening the city to more global capital, coupled with the closure of most of
Bombay’s mills after the 1982 textile strike, leaving some 150,000 workers without jobs, and the
Islamist revolution in nearby Iran, this dialectic of marginalization and power strengthened at the
same time it targeted Muslims with new vigor.42
The Hindu-Muslim riots of 1992-1993, in which some 900 people died, are typically seen
as the high-water mark for this economically shaped religious-cultural tension, but the 1995
official renaming of the city from Bombay to Mumbai—and, thus, the symbolic elimination of
the city’s “cosmopolitanism” or diversity—must also be seen as a casualty of that tension.
Appadurai puts it bluntly but accurately when he writes that, by its violent effort to “cleanse” the

38

Hansen, 72.
Hansen, 73.
40
Hansen, 59.
41
Hansen, 72–73.
42
Hansen, 75.
39

Kennedy

53

city of Muslims, the Shiv Sena effectively “killed” Bombay43—a death that was consecrated by
Maharashtra state via the coalition government of the Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party
and the Shiv Sena itself, which had begun running candidates for office in the mid-1980s.44 By
1990 the group was firmly enmeshed in the state assembly, and from 1995-1999 it governed
Maharashtra in alliance with the Bharatiya Janata. It was also part of the coalition that led India
at large from 1998-2004, and remains a potent force at both state and national levels, as a Google
News search of “Shiv Sena” shows.
My rehearsal of this history of capital in Bombay is admittedly cursory and no doubt
flattening, especially insofar as it examines only one set, albeit a dominant one, of effects. But
what I’m trying to show is how various intersecting political economies—colonial British,
postcolonial Maharashtrian/Indian, and contemporary global—produced three key interlocking
phenomena: mass and continuing material depredation; an informal/criminalized economy; and a
reactionary nativist socio-political form that was able to take advantage of and profit from these
circumstances. I mean “profit” in a broad sense: not just how sainiks materially profited from
their links to formal and informal financial flows, but how they profited symbolically too. I’ve
hinted at this already, particularly in the way that masculinism can transact a lack of material
power into a sense of psychic power, but I want to hone in on this process now.
Hansen makes this point plainly by invoking Jacques Lacan’s notion of objét petit a, or
the lack of the desired object, to explain the insistent focus on virility in the discourse of Shiv
Sena’s founder, Bal Thackeray. In this context, Muslims represent “what is ‘lacking’ in the
Hindu, namely, weakness, effeminacy, and so on.”45 In response to this deficiency, perceived or
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registered unconsciously, the “remedy Thackeray prescribes is to recover Hindu aggressiveness,
restore the martial spirit of the Marathas. The recurrent references to Shivshakti (Shivaji power),
to the myths and anecdotes of Shivaji, to the worship of the war goddess Bhawani all contribute
to that theme.”46 Indeed, the name “Shiv Sena” means “Shiva’s Army,” and the group operates in
the long historical shadow of Shivaji’s army, deployed on behalf of the wide-ranging Maratha
Empire he established in 1674. Seen on this scale, India’s Muslims are both a “tactical obstacle”
to “the full development of Hindu masculinity, and hence the economic and political
development of Hindu society”47 and a barrier to reclaiming past greatness. Violence, then, is an
attempt to reduce this lack of masculinity “through the annihilation and humiliation of the
Muslim ‘other.’”48

Spectacles of Capital II: Narcopolis and the Gangster as Waste

Narcopolis reflects this masculinism in different ways through Thayil’s depictions of
various criminalized lifeworlds in Bombay since the 1960s. The novel’s main narrative thread
(as its title implies) is the role of narcotics in an economically transforming Mumbai, in
particular the effects that opiates and their changing commodity status have on a cast of
characters that includes the owner of a traditional khana, or opium den; a hijra woman who
works in the khana and a nearby brothel; a dada subordinate who sells cocaine and “blackmarket whisky” for his boss, and a native informant who’s returned to the city after a long stint
in New York. The novel foregrounds the history of the opium economy as a stand-in for the

46

Hansen, 90.
Hansen, 92.
48
Hansen, 93.
47

Kennedy

55

wider political economic changes I sketched in the previous section. Specifically, readers
encounter a version of how heroin’s replacement of opium as the in-demand drug in Bombay
affects people who’ve subsisted on wages from the market for the latter—one of many changing
global capital flows that have reshaped Mumbai. (By the novel’s end, for instance, the khana has
been replaced by a call center owned by the khana owner’s son.)
I say “version” because this is Thayil’s particular treatment of the social consequences of
the market shift from opium to heroin, and for the remainder of this section I want to consider
the particular narrative and representational choices the novelist made and their possible effects
on readers—who, since the novel is only available in English, must largely occupy the upper and
middle classes of India and (more likely) of Britain and the U.S.49 Indeed, Narcopolis has done
rather well in the Anglophone literary prestige economy, winning the DSC Prize for South Asian
Literature and having been shortlisted for the Man Booker Prize, the Man Asian Literary Prize,
and the Hindu Literary Prize, the latter an indication of how the book has been received in
religio-cultural contexts.50
Akin Adesokan has argued that “Commonwealth” novels that garner attention in the
West are primarily concerned with representing, or relating to, “political or humanitarian
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emergency.”51 He further asserts that these novels typically share five additional characteristics,
among them a narrator or protagonist who is “culturally innocent or marginal” and who can thus
register the “emotional consequences of familial or public upheavals.”52 These two
characteristics are key for what they evade: “a culturally innocent” character by definition can’t
recognize the structural contexts of their life, and though a “marginal” character may have a
better vantage, the everyday challenges of marginalization may inhibit the full realization of such
a perspective. On the other hand, if “emotional consequences” are prized, literally, by Western
literary elites, then other consequences—political, economic, social—are not. In contrast to their
politically unaware characters, however, the creators of these avatars seem to be quite aware of
the politics of the awards market, adroitly leveraging them to achieve acclaim.53
But, what, exactly, are metropolitan elites rewarding? What are northern readers getting
from a text like Narcopolis—or, on a much grander scale, Slumdog Millionaire? In interviews,
Thayil, born in Kerala, has cited his own experiences in Bombay’s khanas as his chief
inspiration, but whether he was also influenced by Bollywood gangster films or a particular
masculinist ideology is unclear, though he has said he would find “fist fights” between authors
“more satisfying” than intellectual skirmishes.54 Certainly Thayil’s dada-subordinate character,
Salim, styles himself after “two tough-guy actors,” namely John Travolta and Bachchan, and
Thayil gives Salim the opportunity to reference a fictional angry-young-man movie starring the
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latter called Polyester Khadi, “in which Bachchan played a policeman’s son who becomes a
criminal because he sees how hard his father’s life is.”55 “You know what he tells his father,
played by the veteran Sanjeev Kumar?” Salim asks a visitor to the shop he runs, a front for his
criminalized labor. “Are you a man or a pajama?”56
This gender insecurity rises to the level of psychic threat in the manner that Hansen (and
Mbembe) describes. Indeed, Salim is at the center of a passage that fully resonates with their
explications:
It had been a long time since he’d had sex with anyone…much less a woman and a hijrawoman at that. What the Lala did to him wasn’t sex, it was payment. The Lala took his
ass in return for the job opportunity he provided and the pleasure in the exchange was
entirely one-sided. Salim could barely remember what an erection felt like, but at that
moment he felt affection for Dimple and he would have liked to fuck her….Garad comes
from Pakistan. Garad, you know what it means in Urdu? Waste. This is the unrefined shit
they throw away when they make good-quality maal for junkies in rich countries….We
buy it happily and ask for more. And to give it a special kick we add more shit to it and
call it Chemical. Now you might say this is some kind of special ingenuity, a skill, to take
bad shit and make it worse. But I’ll tell you what it really is, we’re khatarnak
sisterfuckers, all of us on Shuklaji Street, we deserve to die….[T]he city belongs to the
politicians and the crooks and some of the politicians are more crooked than the most
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crooked of the crooks. Garad sales are protected, it doesn’t matter that it comes from
Pakistan….[I]n Bumbai money is the only religion.57
In other words, both Salim and the dada figure, the “Lala,” are just the figures of men with lesser
claims on masculinity that Hansen describes, Salim because he’s fucked by the Lala, and the
Lala because he’s fucking a man and not a woman. On the other hand, both men’s nonprocreative sexual desires—Salim wants to fuck Dimple, the novel’s hijra character—jibe with
Mbembe’s concept of expenditure: the non-productive release of energy. Although destruction
isn’t directly implicated in these examples, “waste,” “the unrefined shit they throw away,”
becomes the figure of elimination, which is what the “junkies” in non-“rich countries” get. The
theme of elimination is then amplified to encompass the physical death of people, via
“khatarnak,” a Hindi/Urdu term akin to the adjectival meaning of “killer” and popularized by a
1990 Hindi gangster film of the same name, and Salim’s assertion that “we deserve to die.”
Finally, he references the mutual power of “politicians” and “crooks,” to whom “the city
belongs,” as well as the relationship between governance and “crime” that is the focus of Satya
and Sarkar, rather than the aside it is here. Altogether, the passage purports to offer a glimpse of
everyday life for one of the least powerful members of Mumbai society: a criminalized, sexually
abused laborer on Shuklaji Street, the city’s gentrifying red-light district and the milieu of
Narcopolis’s characters.
Furthermore, the sense clearly emerges in this passage that these workers “deserve to
die”—that they’re waste, or the surplus labor on which capitalism thrives, both in India and
globally. Waste as death and waste as exploited labor conflate in the person totally subjugated to
a value form, and the pleasure of their destruction redounds to the killer acting under conditions
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of privation or to the capital investors who make a killing in profits. But what about the readers
of Narcopolis, surely of different classes and geographic locations from the characters? Might
they, too, enjoy the destruction of these desperate, suffering figures? Is engaging with these
spectacles of strife a form of pleasure, conscious or unconscious? And to the extent that
spectacles, following Debord, mediate social experience—that is, replace social experience with
images, or illusions—are Western consumers in some sense literally consuming, and eliminating,
subaltern lives?
Thayil, notably, doesn’t work against these possible structures of feeling, nor does he
suggest how to transform the conditions that might invite such affective responses, except in the
individual case of the khana owner’s son, who somehow has the wherewithal to recognize the
changing (political) economy and join the ranks of labor exploiters by opening a call center, in
which context he’s still under the heel of global capital. The novel’s only other rescue mission, in
which a character takes Dimple to rehab, is thwarted when she returns to the khana and
overdoses. In the end, the only experience of life Narcopolis give its characters is emotional,
psychic: there’s nary a reference to, let alone a consideration of, structural forces and
possibilities for changing them. Accordingly, the novel in effect naturalizes the criminalized,
“wasted” lifeworld of its characters as well as the political economy that inheres during the
novel’s spacetime. An alternative present, or future, is eliminated from the start.
The novel also eliminates the work that various individuals and groups are in fact doing
in the informal settlements and other sites of “bare life” of Bombay to better living conditions.
Jennifer Robinson critiques the noir form and other dystopic portrayals of southern cities for
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precisely the way they reify the status quo instead of challenging it.58 Indeed, noir, she points
out, is merely the continuation of the colonial trope that rendered indigenous spaces, particularly
cities, darkly, and my own analysis heretofore shows how the “dark form” has been redeployed
in both postcolonial and neocolonial contexts. A more productive strategy, Robinson argues—
and I agree with her—is to place such negative representations—which, after all, highlight the
“inequalities and injustices” that form the living experience of so many—alongside anti-dystopic
images of the complete “range of urban experiences” and “the local inventiveness and rich
diversity” within cities and their histories.59 This is not, she cautions, an endorsement of utopian
thinking but, rather, a refusal to “isolat[e] heroism or hopelessness.”60
Set against this frame, Thayil’s fully dystopic narrative obviously falls short. So does
much intellectual writing about the urban south, such as Mazumdar’s critique, part of an
anthology on insurgent postcolonial urban studies but which nevertheless rehearses timeworn
notions of order and disorder, light and dark. Appadurai’s essay on Bombay’s spectral housing,
however, while “grim,” as the author acknowledges, also points to incipient possibilities for
change, the “neighborhood groups (mohulla committees) committed to squelching rumors and
defusing Hindu-Muslim tensions” and “brilliant pro-poor and housing-related” NGOs among
them.61 Some of these efforts, indeed, are detailed in other literary descriptions of Bombay, such
as Suketu Mehta’s Maximum City, in which not only the Shiv Sena are critically considered but
so, too, are various informal-settlement activists and other social-justice workers. These might
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not be the stories northern readers want to read, but they’re the stories that need to be told—in
concert, of course, with other efforts to disrupt capitalism’s predation.

The Honesty of Redistribution: Sarkar and the “Gangster” as Arbiter of Justice

Housing and social-justice activism serve as the backdrop and theme, respectively, of
Ram Gopal Varma’s Sarkar (2005), about a don of sorts who fights the Indian state for the
benefit of the people in his community, who see him as something like a savior. With its title
Sarkar, a transliterated Hindi word meaning “government” or “state” but also “chief” or “boss,”
the film was widely viewed by both Indian and foreign critics as an “indigenized” version of The
Godfather, and, as I stated earlier, Varma himself called Sarkar a “tribute” to the U.S. classic.
But a tribute, in the first instance, doesn’t imply a copy—per Merriam-Webster, it means “a gift
or service showing respect, gratitude, or affection”62—and Sarkar is in fact not a copy of The
Godfather but, rather, a vision of politics and struggle fully consistent with that of Varma’s
forebears on the Indian subcontinent going back to the original settlements of the East India
Company in the 1700s.
Sarkar begins with an opening sequence that broadly approximates that of The
Godfather—namely, a supplicant from each don’s community who tells a story of woe that they
wish for their don (played by Amitabh Bachchan and Marlon Brando respectively) to resolve.
But as the camera pans out and takes in the larger environment in which Bachchan’s character—
Sarkar—resides, the differences between the two films become pronounced. For one thing, there
is a throng of supporters on the perimeter of Sarkar’s residence, who wait daily to see him appear
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on an upper terrace of the house and wave to them,63 almost like when the Pope makes an
appearance on the balcony of St. Peter’s Basilica before the faithful always gathered in St.
Peter’s Square. There is no similar congregation waiting for an appearance of Brando’s character
in The Godfather, who remains largely bunkered inside his compound except for when he joins
his daughter’s wedding party outside on the enclosed grounds—a private affair sans onlookers.
Moreover, the security systems in place at each enclave are different. In Sarkar, the security is to
protect Sarkar, and his informal governance of community affairs, from the police, the Indian
state, and rival leaders who want to take him down, all of whom are corrupt in Sarkar’s eyes
because they put their own desires for profit above the needs of the housing-insecure and
dispossessed. By contrast, the security in place for Brando’s character is simply to keep other
gangsters away; the police, let alone the U.S. state, are tangential to the plot of The Godfather.
Indeed, by the end of Sarkar, when Bachchan’s character faces a para-military siege, it’s clear
the movie is a political drama about the contest between the formal state and an informal state,
whereas The Godfather, concluding with Michael Corleone’s ascension to don, is ultimately an
intergenerational family saga in which the family is la famiglia. Although Sarkar also ends with
Sarkar’s son assuming the leadership of his family organization, the difference between Sarkar’s
organization and the Godfather’s is stark, for unlike the Italian mafia and its derivatives, which
are business enterprises first and foremost, the Sarkar group isn’t a business at all but a
community defense operation. In other words, if violence is a byproduct of the Godfather’s
informal corporate dealings—a result of the need to expand and protect the family business from
competitors, mainly non-state actors such as fellow mafia families—then violence is the reason
that Sarkar’s organization exists: to protect his people, broadly speaking, from the violence
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meted out by the state through its formal actors: elected representatives, the police, and the
judiciary among them. Altogether, these substantial differences between The Godfather and
Sarkar illustrate how independent Indian gangster films are from Euro-American gangster films.
Put another way, Sarkar reveals how Indian gangster films owe no debt of influence to EuroAmerican gangster films, contrary to the claims I examined earlier in this chapter.
Varma expanded on his “tribute” to The Godfather in an interview following the release
of Sarkar. Speaking to a writer for a Mumbai-based media website, the filmmaker explained that
despite the “strong references to” the Coppola work, including “where the concept and the
setting of the family comes in,” the two films are different in that “Godfather is about a man who
uses the holes in the legal system to get things done. Sarkar is a man who does it in the open. He
dispenses justice to the people, without any authority. Just on the strength of his tremendous
mass popularity and charisma, which even the government cannot do anything about” (emphasis
mine).64 In Varma’s own perspective, then, Sarkar is not an “indigenized” version of The
Godfather but a foil that exposes the substantial contrasts between not just the films as films but
also between the larger sociopolitical contexts in which the films were produced. To be more
specific, The Godfather was created at a time when (1) Italian-identified people in the U.S. had
already climbed the racial hierarchy and were accepted as white people,65 and (2) non-white
people in the U.S., particularly those identified as Black and Brown, were navigating the
backlash to their political gains in the 1960s and suffering from the contraction of the Keynesian
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welfare state that was part of that backlash.66 Moreover, unlike Italian Americans such as
Coppola, who by then had gained the cultural capital to make major motion pictures about
elements of the vast and diverse Italian American community, Black and Brown filmmakers in
the 1970s still struggled for a similar breakthrough. That is to say, by the time of The
Godfather’s release in 1972, Black and Brown people had yet to be taken seriously as authors of
their own narratives by a large enough portion of the mainstream film industry—a structural
discrimination that also confronted Black and Brown authors working in other industries of
media and creative expression (such as literature). In other words, the loopholes in the
Hollywood system (to adapt Varma’s observation) that allowed Coppola to create The Godfather
and have it be an enormous success were simply not available to filmmakers who were locked
into less favorable racial identifications. By contrast, Sarkar was produced at a time when the
Indian state was consolidating its racist biopolitics as the Hindutva (Hindu-nationalist)
movement grew around the country. Indeed, just six years before Sarkar came out in 2005, the
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the leading proponent of Hindutva, finally won control of the
national government for a complete term. And just four years before Sarkar’s release, the current
Indian prime minister, Narendra Modi, had been selected to head the state of Gujarat, where, in
2002, at least 1,044 people died and another 2,500 suffered injuries in a massacre against Muslim
Gujaratis—a massacre in which Modi, along with the police and other government actors, were
widely presumed to be complicit. It’s hard not to see Sarkar as both a reflection of this volatile,
fascist situation and a direct critique of it, especially given the prominent vermilion tilaka Sarkar
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wears on his head, underscoring the adoration of his protectorates. Could Varma have intended
to taunt the BJP with this depiction, or to imply that the same aura of invincibility possessed by
Modi and his lieutenants—who were officially cleared of wrongdoing—could be channeled by
opponents to such political violence and corruption? At the very least, Varma would appear to
have re-presented the reality of the rule of law against whatever fictions the BJP and its
representatives deployed at the time to rationalize or cover up the anti-Muslim pogrom it incited.
In other words, through Sarkar, Varma demonstrated that the rule of law is an instrument of
violent repression wielded against the most vulnerable communities in Indian society—which is
to say all multicultural liberal-democratic societies, where the management of difference by
dominant actors is paramount. As such, in his film, Varma, like the Sarkar character, openly
contradicted the truth claims of a major sector of India’s ruling elite. In so doing—and “without
any authority”—he dispensed a kind of textual justice for all the people targeted by the BJP
regime.
Later in this same interview, Varma again discussed the relationship between Sarkar and
The Godfather, offering more details this time. His remarks are worth quoting at length because
they go to the core of this study’s argument.
The relationship with Godfather is that if Godfather would not have been made, this film
would not have been made. But in spirit, again. Because why do we connect to
Godfather? Before we watched The Godfather or read Mario Puzo’s novels, I never heard
of the mafia, of the cosa nostra. But people like that exist all over the world. They could
be underworld people, or political leaders, dictators, or kings or very powerful people.
All of them have the same story. But the authenticity with which Godfather treated it was
what made it special. And that is what I’m trying to maintain with Sarkar. First of all,

Kennedy

66

Sarkar is not an underworld film. It’s about a man at the head of a feudal set-up in the
middle of a cosmopolitan city, where he almost runs a parallel government largely due to
his personal charisma. And the film is about his friends and enemies, and his family. He
stands up for the rights of the people, what he believes in. So he obviously stands against
some people, and what those people want to do to him—in that lies the conflict.67
There are several observations to make here about Varma’s understanding of his film vis-à-vis
Coppola’s. The first is that he—and by the use of “we” in “why do we connect,” we can assume
Indian cineastes in general—didn’t know about the mafia (“the cosa nostra”) until watching The
Godfather. Moreover, the Godfather character is not distinctive but rather similar to any “very
powerful people,” who “all…have the same story” whether these figures are “underworld people,
or political leaders, dictators, or kings.” Indeed, Varma states that Sarkar “is not an underworld
film,” even though it appears to be one. Instead, Sarkar is a film about a man who “almost runs a
parallel government” to the formal Indian government, “largely due to his personal charisma.”
And that man—a charismatic political leader—“stands up for the rights of the people,” which
means he “obviously stands against some people.” So in Varma’s eyes, Sarkar is not a gangster
film at all but a film about politics and political struggle: that is, whose beliefs about society and
its organization are correct, whose beliefs about society and its organization aren’t correct, and
how those differing beliefs are arbitrated through different forms of power and violence. But
whereas Sarkar focalizes politics, The Godfather erases politics; they lie at the edges of
Coppola’s frame, waiting for a critical analysis. Meanwhile, Sarkar is the critical analysis—and
to claim it’s just an indigenized Godfather, or a copy of a Western or Global Northern genre,
erases the film’s important critical analysis. Indeed, to dismiss Sarkar as a derivative of some
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original form known as the “gangster genre” is to maintain not only an erroneous sense of
influence but also the fiction that the rule of law is used neutrally by governments—or, further,
that the rule of law is a tool for good or a mechanism essential to good governance (claims I
unpack in the next chapter of this study). To the contrary: Sarkar exposes these fictions of liberal
governance, vividly portraying the rule of law in practice, as opposed to the abstract ideal held
up by political opportunists literally banking on the public’s unquestioning of their dubious
rhetoric. For in practice, the rule of law is a bludgeon of the ruling elite, a bloody tool that both
squashes the capacity of mass movements and perpetuates the highly unequal distribution of
resources and life chances in societies structured by racial capitalism and settler colonialism. In
effect, the rule of law in such liberal-democratic societies is a modified version of a monarch’s
absolute power to determine affairs in his territories, just as racial capitalism is a modified form
of the feudalism that Marx said capitalism had vanquished—even if, as Varma points out,
feudalism still exists in various ways.
My analysis of the gangster genre and its occlusions, then, gets to the bottom of how
representation functions in multicultural liberal-democratic societies. On the one hand, the
gangster genre represents a reality that is full of holes (to adapt Varma once more): moments,
narratives, and images that seem true but are in fact false (as Debord warned in 1967).
Furthermore, the gangster genre doesn’t correctly describe films such as Sarkar, which are
uncritically lumped into the genre because of Euro-American centrism. And this flimsy
association between Sarkar and the gangster genre primes critics and viewers to engage films
like Sarkar on the terms of the gangster genre, which means they miss the film’s own terms,
substantially different from those of the gangster genre as they are. Finally, the gangster genre,
like all genres, hides the truth that there’s one basic story concerning “crime” and violence, and
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that story is the continual struggle by competing groups of people for power, resources, and life
chances. By scrambling this basic story about the ongoing battle over the reproduction of society
into an array of genres that are about anything but that battle, genre, as a relation of power,
obscures this material reality. In other words, genre, as a system of categorization (accounting),
contains the insurgent messages in cultural productions, turning liberatory impulses into antiliberatory liberal rhetoric. In this way, the contemporary saturation of genre entertainments in the
U.S. and elsewhere that inspired the phrase “peak genre” acts as a diversion from what’s actually
going on in society. On the other hand, political actors benefit from this diversion, because it
makes it easier for them to avoid accountability for their misdeeds and crimes. The diversion of
genre also makes it’s easier for such political actors to say whatever they want because of the
increasingly prominent split between which political representations are true and which political
representations are false. And this split between the truth or falsity of representations produced
by political actors mirrors the split between the veracity and untruth of representations produced
by entertainment industries. Within this mirror lies the growing gap in knowledge (information)
between different sectors of multicultural liberal-democratic societies—a gap that’s driving
political polarization, otherwise known as the “info wars.”68
At this point I think of genres as cookie cutters, cutting out identifiable narratives,
experiences, images, and people from unbounded expressions of reality by a hugely diverse
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group of meaning makers. If an expression of reality doesn’t fit any of the available shapes, then
that expression is liable to be cut into a different shape, thus distorting its meaning. Or the
difference remains undifferentiated, a remnant of the dough that gets packed back together with
other remnants and kneaded into another thin layer for the cutting process to begin anew. I think
about this process at scale, over the long duration of global modernity, and I understand how
truth has been buried in lies.
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FIG. 1
Scanned Filmfare commentary about the ostensible plagiarism of Indian films in the
1970s (pink markings mine).
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FIG. 2
Scanned Filmfare commentary about “angry” Amitabh Bachchan, purported plagiarism,
and criminality (pink markings mine).
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FIG. 3
Screengrabs of Ram Gopal Varma’s Sarkar.
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CHAPTER TWO

“Crime Must be Criminalised”: South Africa, Transitional Justice, and PostApartheid Imaginaries of Reform and Change

You know what they say about South African Airways—they didn’t invent flying, they
just perfected it? I think the same is true about violence in South Africa!
—Graeme Simpson, co-founder of the Centre for the Study of Violence and
Reconciliation (n.d.)

In 1999, the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), known as the “master’s
voice” during apartheid,1 premiered a show that prominently featured Black gangsters as a threat
to South Africa’s post-apartheid transition to liberal democracy and rule of law. Set at “Supatsela
High,” Yizo Yizo (typically translated as “This Is It”) was a bit like the Canadian Degrassi
franchise, featuring a range of students and tracking their lives in and out of school. The two
seasons of the show also followed the travails of the school principal and various teachers,
alternately committed or corrupt, as well as some fringe characters who existed on the perimeter
of both the narrative and the school campus—and of the South African economy at large: a
couple of gangsters, a minibus-taxi driver, and an elder among them. The series was an
enormous hit in South Africa, and the show also circulated more broadly, including to the U.S.,
where it was interpreted in one magazine account as a revealing representation of the postapartheid transition.2
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Yizo Yizo was given a “mandate” from the South African Department of Education “to
stimulate debate about the conditions of education in South African townships.”3 Further, notes
Litheko Modisane, the series “was accompanied by an intensive and deliberate orchestration of
debate,” which he reads in part as an intervention in “the postapartheid public sphere.” Indeed,
he writes, Yizo Yizo “is a multithemed engagement of postapartheid social relations.”4 Given this
two-fold intention, then, by the state, working through its media apparatus, to spur debate about
post-apartheid education and social relations, Yizo Yizo is a capacious example of just want kind
of intervention the state and its surrogates, including the Yizo Yizo creative team in SABC’s
employ, thought was needed.
Modisane goes on to detail the aims of the intervention on its own terms, including the
ostensible “shock tactics” of the series “calculated to grab the attention of parents and children”
and thus spur debate, concluding that the public
deliberations around Yizo Yizo exceeded the aims of the SABC, the Department of
Education, and the filmmakers. By privileging the antisocial aspects amongst the black
youth as the window through which to draw attention to the perceived educational and
social shortcomings in township schools, Yizo Yizo unwittingly stimulated the public
deliberations on blackness and aesthetics.5
In other words, Modisane understands the show as “unwittingly” circulating stereotypes of “antisocial” Black youth, stereotypes which became the focus of public discussion and were reified
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by it, rather than the educational conditions of Black youth, the ostensible focus of the show and
the intended focus of public discussion.
But while I share Modisane’s concern about the show’s contribution to longstanding
discourses of Black pathology and criminality, I differ with him on the “unwittingly” part, for on
the terms of neoliberal multiculturalism and its civilizing/disqualifying regime, the state has a
vested interest in differentiating good racialized subjects from bad racialized subjects. Far from
being unwitting, then, I read the public disciplining of Yizo Yizo’s “anti-social” characters—the
gangsters and their associates, in the series and in material reality (“this is it”)—as the intentional
outcome of their representations on the show as threats to South Africa’s re-integration into the
international community post-apartheid.
Granted, this intention wasn’t spelled out in any SABC or Department of Education
documents pertaining to the series. However, through a reading of the many documents
associated with an earlier series the SABC co-produced with a Johannesburg-based NGO, I show
how the template for Yizo Yizo was set in accordance with the criminal-justice reforms carried
out by the post-apartheid state for the sake of economic development. In what follows, then, I
offer a behind-the-scenes look, as it were, of the many contexts elided by Yizo Yizo and the
mainstream discussion of the show. I conclude by speculating—in part through a reading of J. M.
Coetzee’s 1999 novel Disgrace—on how South African social relations might truly be
transformed, in contrast to the country’s actual transformation, which has largely left white
privilege in place.

Kennedy

77

“Crime Must Be Criminalised”: Post-Apartheid Criminal Justice Reform

In 1995, one year into South Africa’s post-apartheid liberal democracy, during the
Government of National Unity, the toppled National Party that ruled the country from 1948-1989
issued a white paper entitled “Towards a Successful National Anti-Crime Strategy.” After noting
that the World Health Organization had “branded” South Africa “the most murderous country in
the world,” the authors provided a list of “requirements for an effective strategy” to reduce
“crime” for the sake of political, economic, and social development. Number four on this list was
“Crime must be criminalised. There can no longer be any excuses for crime.”6 That highlighted
non-sequitur—“crime must be criminalized”—captures the widespread confusion about “crime”
throughout the South African government and civil society in the immediate transition from
apartheid to post-apartheid. For one confusion, how could “crime”—normatively understood as
an offense against the rule of law—be criminalized when the legal act of criminalization—to
make something criminal—is what defines “crime” jurisprudentially in the first place? For
another, how would the post-apartheid state address its inheritance of the far-reaching violence
of the apartheid state? Indeed, how would the interpersonal violence deemed criminal by the
state—that which garnered South Africa the dubious reputation of “most murderous country in
the world”—be understood in relation to the crimes against humanity of the explicitly whitesupremacist state and their legacies in the liberal state that succeeded it?
These confusions and the questions they raised were never resolved in post-apartheid
South Africa, despite the country’s ballyhooed reputation for transitioning from minority rule to
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liberal democracy with a minimum of bloodshed. Indeed, the question of South Africa’s ongoing
“transformation,” and how much the structures of apartheid have been eroded by multi-racial
representative government, remains a primary topic of discussion in the country. At the center of
much of this debate is the notion of “white monopoly capital,” or the continuing hold settler
South Africans have on capital accumulation and flows. This collusion between state and
capital—a primary feature of liberal democracy—was brought into sharp relief with the 2012
massacre of 34 striking Lonmin miners by officers of the South African Police Service.7
Interpreted by many observers as an attempt by the government to break the strike—the
country’s current president, Cyril Ramaphosa, was a member of Lonmin’s non-executive board
at the time—at the very least the action of police shooting idled workers highlighted the
fundamental role of the police: to safeguard racial capital and to secure the settler state.8 Indeed,
this motive—to preserve the privilege of white monopoly capital even though formal political
power was being transferred—was at the heart of the National Party’s interest in preventing
“crime”: if that “problem” were not dealt with, it would “lead to the undoing of all the positive
developments in the political field, the demise of economic progress and the disintegration of our
social fabric.”9 That the anti-“crime” strategy issued by the former apartheid rulers essentially
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became the official post-apartheid National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) of 1998
emphasizes one of many important continuities between South Africa’s white-supremacist mode
and its liberal form inaugurated by the nation-state’s turn to representative democracy.
While some South African scholars have criticized the “preoccupation” with the
“continuities between apartheid and democratic policing,” noting that “new and benign forms of
policing were written into the constitution itself,” which have distinguished the former era and
the current one, others have critiqued the idea of transitional justice—the overarching category of
political, economic, and social reform demarcating the transition from an illegitimate state to a
legitimate one.10 Indeed, as Tshepo Madlingozi argues, transitional justice is “meant to
legitimize the new government, accomplish nation building and set new norms and values for a
new society.”11 Moreover, given the one-way traffic in transitional justice, in which governments
and institutions of the Global North facilitate the normative development of the Global South,
the process of assimilating countries into the Westphalian system is “one of the most effective
vehicles for the imposition of Western epistemologies” and the concomitant rejection of nonWestern “epistemologies and ways of being in the world.” As such, in “historically settler
colonies” such as South Africa, the application of transitional justice amounts to a shift “from
settler domination to settler hegemony”—or what kindred scholars call the conversion of white
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supremacy into racial liberalism.12 This shift, in essence, is assimilative: in order to enter the
community of nations, (formerly) colonized peoples must accept—through the practices of
transitional justice—the liberal version of the domination just ended. On this point, Madlingozi
cites South African freedom fighter Steve Biko, tortured by police and left to die in a prison cell
in 1977, who rejected assimilation and its related mode of integration: “If by integration you
understand a breakthrough into white society by blacks, an assimilation and acceptance of blacks
into an already established set of norms and code of behavior set up and maintained by whites,
then YES I am against it.”13 In this way, the South African transition can be understood as an
ongoing struggle for and against the continued imposition of a colonial teleology of “progress” in
a putatively postcolonial state.
One way of understanding this struggle is through the role of South African civil society,
which aided the transition from settler domination to settler hegemony even as it ostensibly
worked on behalf of the nation’s Black majority. These non-governmental organizations,
modeled on their international counterparts and often collaborating with them, both advised the
new government in its transition to liberal norms and sought to repair the manifold damages of
apartheid. Chief among these damages were the material, psychic, and social costs of violence.
One organization made the study of these costs its reason for being: the Centre for the Study of
Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR), established at Johannesburg’s University of the
Witwatersrand in 1989. Befitting its name, the CSVR became a key transitional-justice player,
engaging in a panoply of reform initiatives, from operating a trauma clinic and holding focus
groups on racism in schools to trying to make sense of the conceptual incoherence of “crime”
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and its relationships to violence, nation-building, and transformation. Two projects in particular
were emblematic of the CSVR’s overall vision and practice: its participation in the development
of the NCPS, and its production of an educational-media series called East Side that aired on the
South African Broadcasting Corporation in 1999.
In this chapter, based primarily on an extensive review of the CSVR collection at the
Historical Papers archive of the University of the Witwatersrand, I offer a snapshot of how the
organization addressed South Africa’s transition with both liberal and transformative approaches.
In the first half, I look at the CSVR’s history, its conceptualization of violence and “crime,” and
its contributions to the NCPS; in the second, I examine the production context and creation of
East Side and the social interventions it staged. I conclude by speculating on how to alter the
imaginations of settler people and other beneficiaries of white monopoly capitalism so that, in
combination with movements on the ground, genuine transformation might take hold.

From Activist Research to Liberal Reformism: Responses to Violence and “Crime”

The CSVR was established with the initial name of the Project for the Study of Violence
and the mission to analyze and respond to the multiple forms of violence in South African
society stemming from the comprehensive state violence of apartheid. As co-founder and former
executive director Graeme Simpson recounted in an undated interview with the CSVR’s
fundraising strategy team, the organization’s “primary motivation at that stage was very much
rooted in an anti-apartheid tradition, which was shaped by a priority concern with state
violence.” Moreover, he noted, by the time of the CSVR’s founding, the violence of the
apartheid state, as well as the “struggle between the state and people, had translated themselves
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more and more into internecine conflict within oppressed communities and within all
communities in society.”14
Based at the University of the Witwatersrand “more for the sake of protection in a fairly
repressive environment” than a “commitment to academic research,” the CSVR nevertheless had
an “orientation” to “action research”: what Simpson described as “research for social change,
policy making, and for influencing social process.” Simpson didn’t elaborate on his
understanding of social change, nor how his idea of social change meshed with policymaking or
“influencing social process.” He did, however, state that the CSVR’s “activist orientation was
never allowed to compromise the rigor, the thoroughness, and the quality of the research work
we did.” This qualification suggests a certain fealty to academic norms despite the ambivalence
expressed earlier about academic research.
In 1990, the government of National Party leader and South African president F. W. de
Klerk legalized the ANC and other political parties, putting the country firmly on the path to
liberal democracy—a goal that De Klerk himself endorsed in his bellwether speech to the South
African Parliament that year.15 Although his rhetorical commitment to “equal rights, treatment
and opportunity in every sphere of endeavor” masked De Klerk’s intention to maintain privilege
for white South Africans after minority rule, his language played to international demands for
South Africa to join the community of liberal-democratic nation states premised on the feint of
equality. In addition to launching a series of reforms, the De Klerk government began a three-
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year period of negotiations with the ANC and other political actors that led to the first
democratic elections in 1994. But the freedom conferred on political parties like the ANC (and
its leader, Nelson Mandela, released from prison), coupled with reforms like the end of pass
restrictions, created an upsurge in violence, as long repressed anti-apartheid and ethnic forces did
battle with each other and with state security forces. At the time, eleven different police forces
operated in the country, and there were easily as many informal security formations, from the
“self-defense units” of the ANC to protect their supporters from the police and rival political
actors to the forces of those rivals, like the Inkatha Freedom Party and the Afrikaner Resistance
Movement.16
This liminal moment—the prelude to the overall political transition from 1994 onward—
plunged the CSVR into its work. As Simpson stated: “Suddenly the tradition that we emerged
from—of opposition to a government which is responsible for huge levels of state violence—
suddenly, there were all sorts of new opportunities that presented themselves for influencing the
processes of change.” Two of the opportunities they “seized” would become the organization’s
main areas of intervention over the next decade: reforming social attitudes through “the public
media” and “educational tools,” and reforming the police and “institutions of justice.” Intergroup youth relations were prioritized from the start: “work focussed on change involving young
black kids and young white kids together. That was a powerful way of attracting donor interest at
that stage, because of the image and the romance of the transition that it captured.” Accordingly,
the CSVR began to create an educational-media “strategy for broadening our influence on
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society, for translating our information and the analysis that we were developing into much more
of a public discourse through the press” and public appearances.
The CSVR also identified the police and correctional services as opportunities for
intervention. Like public schools and public media, the police and prisons were “institutions of
apartheid [that] were being inherited by the new government,” Simpson stated. The police in
particular were a source of concern, he noted, “because they were the primary violators of human
rights under the apartheid era….and yet here we were confronting a…negotiation phase in which
they had an absolutely key role to play as guardians of the transition process.”17 Recalling the
perceived bind between activist research and academic rigor, Simpson implied another bind in
this observation: between the police as the “primary violators of human rights” during apartheid
and the police as essential “guardians of the transition process.” This instance is the only
consideration in the Simpson interview of the tension between the police as human-rights
violators and the police as guarantors of a successful political transition—a consistent analytical
lack in the CSVR’s work over the years.
Instead of working directly with members of the South African police force, as it did with
school students, faculty, and staff, the CSVR chose to participate in police reform at the
governmental level by helping create the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS).
According to a 1995 draft document by the Ministry of Safety and Security, the NCPS was
necessary because “crime is at present one of the major constraints on development and
economic growth. Levels of fear and victimisation are unacceptable for a society which aspires
to protect the fundamental rights of all our citizens.”18 Moreover, the NCPS would target the
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“root causes of crime and factors which help to lead citizens into committing crimes. Rather than
simply focusing on deterrence and reaction, the NCPS will identity [sic] ways of reducing the
opportunities and motivation for crime.” Altogether, instead of “stemming the tide” of “crime”
as was the purpose of “existing crime prevention efforts,” the NCPS would focus on “cutting of
[sic] the flow at it’s [sic] source.” In addition to tying “crime” prevention to both economic
growth and civil rights, these passages invoke a monolithic national community, in keeping with
the color-blind cast of the new nation. The rhetorical substitution of “identity” for “identify,”
however, subtly betrays the homogeneous nation building at work in this document. Too, the
emphasis on “cutting off” the “flow” of “crime” versus “stemming the tide” suggests a more
forceful approach to “crime” in the post-apartheid state than in the apartheid one.
Simpson would join the strategy team drafting the NCPS, led by Janine Rauch, the
former manager of the CSVR’s Policing Research Project who’d left the organization to become
an advisor to the minister of safety and security—one of many CSVR staffers to move into
government roles and thus spread the organization’s analysis, such as it was, of “crime.”19 In a
preview of the final policy statement, the strategy team offered their “vision” for the NCPS,
which explicitly linked “peace and safety” to “economic development,” just as those dual
valences were implicitly linked in the National Party’s anti-“crime” proposal:
South Africa is a society where it’s [sic] inhabitants can pursue their daily lives in peace
and safety free from undue fear of crime and violence. It is a society in which the
fundamental rights of the individual are effectively protected with the support and co-
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operation of fellow citizens. Economic development amongst all sectors is unhindered by
fear, and South Africa attracts the confidence of investors and the interests of tourists.20
The repetition of “fear” in this statement is revealing. First used in the context of protecting
South Africans’ right to be “free” from “crime and violence,” the second use of the term defends
the assumed right for “economic development” to be “unhindered by fear”: an abstract relation
that is given material form with the subsequent mention of “investors” and “tourists.” In other
words, the right of South African nationals to be free of “crime” and violence is made equal to
the right of non-national investors and tourists to be free of the same. This contradiction between
national determination and global determination, as it were, surfaced again in a discussion of
“crime” prevention and the rule of law. In describing the “character” of the NCPS, the strategy
team asserted that the “international experience around crime prevention suggests that there is no
simple relationship between poverty and deprivation and crime levels.”21 Moreover, given “the
influence of internationally based crime syndicates and large imbalances between rich and poor,
improvements in poverty levels are unlikely to impact substantially on crime levels.” These
related claims, unsupported by any citations, together give an alibi to the fundamental role of
economic inequality in criminalized activity, declaring not only that there is no “simple”
relationship between poverty, deprivation, and “crime” but no relationship at all, since
“improvements in poverty levels” will have little bearing on “crime” reduction. Both assertions
also privilege “international” contexts for their authority, rather than the locally informed
knowledge of the kind the CSVR was pursuing in its work outside the NCPS. In sum, instead of
analyzing criminalized activity as a multiply constituted formation, not least by the state and its
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power of law-making, “crime” is promulgated by the strategy team as a natural phenomenon
sans structural factors. Likewise, “crime” prevention is dependent not on addressing those
structural factors but on a “wider acceptance of a human rights culture,” one “where the state is
seen as [sic] reliable and effective enforcer of the law.”22 In this way, the responsibility for
“crime” prevention is placed upon individual South Africans, who must accept a “human rights
culture” in which the rule of law is unquestioned.
The strategy team made one more noteworthy implication in this report. Having bypassed
structural factors like poverty or the ramifications of state violence, the team suggested that
“crime” was an effect of ontology, contending that “criminality” was “the result of a large
number of interwoven factors, including the erosion of community values, unrealised
expectations, exposure to violence, and high social tolerance of criminality.” Furthermore,
“exploitation of the youth and the reality that the ‘illegal sector’ provides, in many cases,
appealing role models for the marginalised youth has created a situation where the criminal
sector finds an ample stream of willing recruits.” Not only does this observation pass the buck,
so to speak, for “crime” and violence from the structures and policies of the apartheid-cum-postapartheid state to “marginalised youth,” thus completing the erasure of the state’s continuous role
in founding and managing violence through the rule of law and political economy, but it nearly
reverses Simpson’s own perspective just three years earlier on the “factors” informing
“criminality.” In a news analysis that highlighted the difficulty in discerning “the point at which
crime-related violence starts and political violence stops,” Simpson was quoted as follows:
In the context of massive unemployment increasing recession, a community which is
largely uneducated and politically and socially voiceless and marginalised, there is a
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ready engagement first in acts of violence out of sheer frustration, and second in the trade
of arms, the trade in assassination, the trade in protection, which have actually provided a
material base for many youths.23
In contrast to the pathological explanation advanced by the strategy team (“high social tolerance
of criminality”), here Simpson makes a distinctly materialist argument that recognizes the
political and economic factors undergirding “acts” of violence. And though he maintains a focus
on marginalized youth, his description of the “material base” in the trade in arms, assassinations,
and protection more accurately described the contours of both the apartheid state and the postapartheid state, as Charles Tilly has observed of state-making in general.24
By the end of the 1990s, the CSVR and its alumni throughout the government seemed to
accept the reality that genuine change was no longer on the horizon. Rauch, for example, having
left government, uncritically appraised the reform of police—a process in which she had
ostensibly been involved. First noting that the police had difficulty “coping with the political
transition and adapting to policing in a democratic society,” she went on to observe that the
effort to “institutionalise civilian oversight and control” had weakened because “the new police
leadership appointed after 1999 [was] more credible.”25 Moreover, the ANC government had
planned to “reform the police gradually, rather than radically,” as the Minister of Safety and
Security told police in meetings across the country—meetings designed to provide “a human
face” to the new political leadership.26 But the “public” in this case was not the Black majority,
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which, Rauch notes later, never gained any confidence in the police post-1994.27 The public,
instead, was the police, to which the Black government—the representatives of Black South
Africans—sought to humanize itself. In other words, Black South Africans, comprehensively
dehumanized under apartheid, were now compelled—through their elected leaders—to humanize
themselves to the frontline agents of that dehumanization: the police.
In contrast, the police as an institution were never held accountable for their
indispensable role in the dehumanization of apartheid: as President Mandela emphasized to the
South African parliament in 1995, “the Government is opposed to and has no intention to
conduct a witch hunt against the police as a result of activities arising from orders given…by the
apartheid regime.”28 And yet, a few paragraphs later, he declared that “people have continued to
die as a result of the continuing practice of racism,” and that “those who are responsible for these
crimes of racism must be brought to book without delay.” Although he was not speaking of the
police in this context, the contradiction between holding accountable civilian perpetrators of
racist violence in the post-apartheid era and not holding accountable the police perpetrators of
racist violence during the apartheid era is stark. Indeed, instead of the government and nongovernmental organizations like the CSVR working together to transform the institutions of law
and order inherited from the apartheid state, the onus was on Black South Africans to assimilate
to those institutions—reformed perhaps but not transformed.
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Post-Apartheid Education: Challenging Assimilation and Containing Change

Instead of the police, the perpetrators of the “crimes of racism” Mandela referred to in his
1995 speech were white protesters against “the use of a former white school by black children.”
A version of this anti-integration theme—and how to overcome such complaints—would
become the subject of the CSVR’s educational-media series East Side, which the organization
developed at the same time it assisted with the NCPS. Co-produced with the education division
of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), on which it aired in 1999, the fictional
show focused on cross-racial encounters between students and teachers in a high school in a
formerly white area of Johannesburg. It culminated with the intervention of a human-rights
official to instruct the school community on the values of the new South Africa. As such, East
Side represented the CSVR’s desire for “a popular culture of human rights.”29
East Side was one of many “edutainment” programs released in the immediate postapartheid period to educate the “public” on the new human-rights culture that was being
introduced and developed by the state and civil society. These programs were meant to address
the third of the NCPS’s four “pillars”—“Public Values and Education”—and were created in
combination with significant community outreach.30 The first of these series, Soul City,
premiered on SABC in 1994; produced by the Soul City Institute for Health and Development
Communication, its initial season focused on “mother and child health including HIV/AIDS,
immunisation, breastfeeding, diarrhoea and dehydration, maternal health, acute respiratory
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illness, paraffin poisoning, and burns.”31
In contrast to Soul City, East Side was a much smaller-scale production, befitting its
radical theme of white supremacy and cross-racial social relations. In this regard, the series
marked a departure not just from the other edutainment of the period but also from the CSVR’s
work on the NCPS, which didn’t address race or social relations in its narrow focus on “crime”
and its prevention. Indeed, the work that East Side attempted to do—to shift viewers’
imaginations about themselves and their fellow citizens in the new South Africa—was decidedly
outside the framework of the NCPS. Instead of targeting Black South Africans for the prevention
of “crime,” East Side sought to highlight the multiple relationships and conflicting agendas that
produce the idea of “crime” in the first place. As such, East Side emphasized that “crime” is not
a social reality—that is, a product of ontological predispositions—but a political ideology: an
imaginative structure that locks into material structures to reproduce inequality and violence. In
highlighting social relations, then, East Side pointed the way toward social transformation rather
than education. And it did so specifically by challenging settler viewers’ imagination of their role
in the post-apartheid society.
In East Side, Black characters were placed at the center of the narrative, with the white
characters on the periphery: a full reversal of the apartheid system and white-minority rule. It
was this switch in power that sets the plot of the series in motion, as a Black student named
Mindlos, bused in from Soweto along with other classmates, contests the classroom rule of a
white teacher resistant to the changes accompanying transition. This dynamic of confrontation is
introduced in one of the series’s early scenes, when the teacher insults Mindlos. “Look at that
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handwriting, it looks like a dog’s breakfast. You’re never going to get anywhere with work like
that,” the teacher says.32 “In my class, you will write properly. Is that clear?” Mindlos musters a
“yes.” A couple of scenes later, the teacher complains to a colleague in the faculty lounge about
having “that new boy” “dumped” on him—“I don’t remember being asked.” He’s told Mindlos
is “quite a bright boy,” and that he should give him “a chance.” The teacher responds: “I’m not
opposed to giving the boy a chance. It’s just that I can’t read his writing. It looks as though he’s
never held a pen before.” The teacher’s inability to “read” Mindlos’s writing is a striking
metaphor for the difficulty white South Africans have had understanding Black South Africans.
Too, the specific difficulty around reading and writing suggests a larger epistemological tension
between an Afrocentric and Indigenous context on the one hand and a European and settler one
on the other. Mindlos will either accept his teacher’s terms and write legibly—that is,
assimilate—or he will abide his own norms and co-exist in difference—a radical proposition in a
country focused on development and integration.
Mindlos chooses the second option and refuses to acquiesce to his teacher’s demands, a
choice that propels East Side to its two pivotal events: the caning of Mindlos by the teacher, and
Mindlos and his classmates rising up against such violence. In the first instance, Mindlos arrives
late to class, thanks to both the distance he lives from the school (a geographical legacy of
apartheid) and the unreliability of the informal transportation system on which he depends (an
infrastructural legacy of apartheid). When he tries to explain this context to the teacher, the
teacher is predictably irritated. “Don’t be cheeky, boy. If you’re late, you’re late,” he says.33
Mindlos looks to his Black classmates for support, saying “Tell him” in a southern African
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language—a lingual choice that further annoys the teacher: “English. You speak English in this
school.” Mindlos is defiant, responding in his language, “I’m not talking to you, old man.” When
the teacher asks him what he said, Mindlos rephrases in English: “I said I’m not talking to you,
and I can speak any language I want to.” This radical assertion—that Mindlos can speak any
language he wants to, regardless of his teacher’s classroom rule—is met with punishment: the
next scene occurs in the school gym, with the teacher, shot from below, bouncing a switch in his
palm; Mindlos is out of the frame, save for a piece of his school uniform. “It’s about the basic
principle of education, one of which is discipline,” the teacher instructs. “This isn’t the township.
Here we respect authority. Now bend over.” Mindlos’s face enters the frame, occupying its
center, and then three different classroom scenes follow in place of the actual caning, which isn’t
shown: One in which the Bill of Rights is being discussed, another in which a geometry lesson is
reviewed, and the third in which the Afrocentric notion of ubuntu is defined—by a Black
teacher—as “We are because of other people.” The final image in the sequence is of Mindlos
crying in pain.
These scenes of education substitute for the violent discipline Mindlos suffers by the
hand of his white teacher, an act of punishment that reinforces the autocratic rule of settler
domination. And yet, presumably to reflect the political transition underway at the time, the
series omits the sight of such terror in favor of milestones of progress: South Africa’s new Bill of
Rights, the ethical ideal of ubuntu (a major rhetorical element of the country’s official truth and
reconciliation process, which had concluded the year of East Side’s release), and Black and
white schoolchildren learning academics without controversy or interruption. Nevertheless, the
violence perpetrated by white people upon Black people that was the sine qua non of the
apartheid era remains in the picture. Much like the attempt to defuse that historical violence in
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the reforms undergirding the NCPS, East Side aims to resolve a micro version of that violence by
casting it as a relic: a form of discipline that belongs to the past, not the present. But well-worn
tracks do not simply disappear, and in the series, while some of the liberal-minded faculty
endeavor to deal with the teacher on their own, Mindlos has more altercations with the teacher as
well as a group of white male students. These incidents eventually lead to Mindlos’s expulsion—
a separation that the Black students protest by boycotting classes and assembling en masse
outside the school. In the sixth and final episode of the series, the teacher, showing no remorse
(“You want us to lie down and take it”) but recognizing he’s not “welcome” at the school
anymore, has resigned; Mindlos is reinstated as a pupil; and the principal announces the creation
of a “transformation forum” at the behest of the local human-rights commission “to guide us as
we deal with the problems that have surfaced recently.”34 He explains: “The forum will deal with
racism, cultural tensions, and cultural diversity in the school. And any teacher, prefect, or pupil
that uses language or practice that is proven to be racist will be dealt with in the extreme.” In this
way, the school preserves discipline in the new era of transformation: whereas the teacher
employed discipline out of racist motives (it’s revealed he only caned Black students), going
forward any member of the school community who is similarly “proven to be racist” will be
disciplined in the spirit of anti-racism. Again, like the example of the NCPS, the power to define
positive and negative dimensions of discipline remains with the administration, here of the
school rather than of the state. Meanwhile, the Black students’ protest is disappeared, the boycott
of classes apparently concluded with Mindlos’s reincorporation into the school.
Discipline, of course, is a fundamentally carceral idea, originating from the “punishment
or chastisement either imposed by ecclesiastical authority or voluntarily undertaken as penance”;
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the instrument of such punishment was also known as a discipline.35 This original meaning later
acquired the secular connotations of “training, instruction, or method,” but the intention of
correcting individual and group practices stayed. In this way, discipline is part and parcel of the
civilizing missions of both global Christian charity and colonialism, in which education played a
key role, whether in the formal setting of school or the informal setting of ideology. However,
while these valences of education-as-discipline are on full display in East Side, the radical action
of the Black students—and the sense of violation the white teacher feels upon his departure—
linger beyond the frame of the series. The former instantiation recalls both the history and future
of Black student protest in South Africa, in particular the Soweto uprising of 1976 led by
teenagers in opposition to learning Afrikaans and the Fallist demonstrations of recent years.36 In
neither case were students pacified by recourse to human-rights rhetoric or reform, as Mindlos
and his classmates are portrayed to be. As he says at series end, in the final words of the
production: “So that’s it—this is my school. And even if I still don’t know if it’s any better, you
can’t deny there are advantages.”37 Although these “advantages” are left for the viewer to intuit,
the SABC’s follow-up series, Yizo Yizo, made without the cooperation of the CSVR, provided
one answer: the potential of upward mobility and middle-class respectability. In that show,
which debuted in 1999, becoming a huge ratings hit and eliciting media coverage from around
the world, academics-oriented Black students at a township school were pitted against their
trouble-making gangster peers—criminals with no hope of development into productive
laborers.38
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Indeed, rather than pursue a second season of East Side that might have grappled further
with the dynamics of transformation, the CSVR educational-media team decided to leverage its
partnership with the SABC, deemed the “master’s voice” during apartheid, and approach the
South African Police Service with a tender offer to produce a documentary about the Public
Order Policing Unit, notorious for its disciplining of anti-apartheid protesters with “teargas,
rubber bullets, water cannons, and live ammunition.”39 Ostensibly reformed by the time of the
CSVR’s pitch, the unit “represent[ed] one of the most successful transformation stories in the
South African political landscape.”40 But, as with the NCPS, the changes to the unit were not
substantial: the tender documents reference a shift in policy from “crowd control” to “crowd
management,” “the appointment of new management,” and “changes in corporate image.” As
with East Side’s erasure of the student protest, the challenges of transformation were deferred to
the future, in keeping with colonial temporality, and the police unit was essentially rebranded.41
And like the introduction of the country’s new political leadership in 1994 to the national police
corps, the rebranding of the unit would rely on humanization—the proposed angle of the
CSVR’s documentary, which would “put a human face to the Public Order Police Unit and show
the many challenges that they face on a daily basis.” Further, the main example the CSVR
provided of its capacity in this regard was East Side. Although there is no record of a finished
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documentary in the CSVR’s archive, the tender documents underscore the organization’s
consistent strategy of liberalizing the institutions of apartheid, even with initiatives such as East
Side that contained the kernels of genuine transformation.

From 1994 to Now: The Horizon of Transformation

In spite of the CSVR’s ultimate suppression of East Side’s insurgent themes, East Side’s
focus on white supremacy and white-on-Black violence highlighted a strategy for transformative
change: the exposure of the crimes committed by settlers in the ongoing defense of the settler
state. But the question of scale here is paramount: How can representations such as Mindlos’s
refutation of the white teacher’s power, and his and his classmates’ struggle to re-form their
school, avoid the disciplining of liberal reformers, as happened with these narrative flights in
East Side? Moreover, even if such anti-disciplinary representations elude the reach of liberal
gatekeepers such as the CSVR, how can they avoid rebukes from the political establishment or
their commodification by the culture industries? To be sure, these are questions not only relevant
to South African society but to all national polities in the afterlife of formal colonialism.
The CSVR was correct in advocating for a different popular culture to match the different
political culture taking shape post-apartheid. The organization was mistaken, however, in
thinking a popular culture of human rights in tandem with a slate of liberal political reforms
would constitute a definitive split from the apartheid era. Such an imagination can only envision
tweaks to the status quo, not the abolition of it. A transformative imaginary, by contrast,
envisions a world in which there is no discipline, because white monopoly capital has been
redistributed, thus rendering surplus the violence required by the multi-scalar fight over the
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accumulation, maintenance, and control of resources. Consequently, there are no police to
impose obedience on the differential access to resources of the current global order.
As Denise Ferreira da Silva has argued, the modern global system of “political-symbolic”
representation inaugurated by Enlightenment thought is predicated on a Subject who secures his
sovereignty through the elimination of others.42 Animated by the police shootings of Black and
Brown people that are endemic to the U.S. and Brazil settler states, Silva’s analysis of the ontoepistemological logic of what might be termed the master’s psyche exposes the violence at the
heart of self-identity: an individual’s differentiation from a group. Divided from the collective,
other individuals now pose threats to one’s self-determination, constantly unsettling one’s selfesteem. This ontological problem, Silva shows, emerged with the discovery of the scientific laws
of nature, so that “mentally (morally and intellectually) distinct kinds of human beings” became
the objects of knowledge, in the same way that different species of non-human animals were
classified by genus.43 Thus the science of race was created to explain these “differences,” coconstitutively with all the modern disciplines of knowledge.
This account of modern subjectivity—natural selection as both knowledge formation and
social organization—resonates with Frantz Fanon’s account of racial subjugation as
estrangement from oneself and Wynter’s analysis of the same as the foundational procedure in
the generic classifications of the human.44 All three arguments also resonate with Biko’s refusal
to assimilate to the onto-epistemological norms of the South African settler—what he described
as the “superior-inferior white-black stratification that makes the white a perpetual teacher and
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the black a perpetual pupil.”45 Instead, Biko and his Black Consciousness kin called for a full
break with the settler epistemology of racial difference—not the embrace of the non-racial that
officially accompanied South Africa’s transition to post-apartheid. Although the non-racial may
seem like a positive development, it’s a reform because it leaves in place the racial as a category:
ostensibly superseded but still active in practice. In a transformative change, by contrast, race as
both a category and a system would be superseded and the color line and its manifestations
would fall. Black Consciousness was “not the end goal,” as Madlingozi writes, “but an
uncompromising anti-thesis against the totality of the power structure and its production of
others as non-existent.”46 The solution to the problem of race relations, in other words, lies
outside the relation of race.
To return to the question of popular culture, representations are needed that continually
expose, rather than reify, the relation of race. East Side accomplished this task by showing Black
students challenge the Subject-object relation that mediates the race relation. And it did so by
presenting the disciplinary violence of liberal education as a subset of the overall violence of
liberalism: a weapon, whether in the form of the teacher caning Mindlos and other Black
students or in the form of coerced assimilation to an epistemology of human rights. Put another
way, if apartheid required the disciplining of Black workers through the “hard” racism of white
supremacy (settler domination), then post-apartheid requires the disciplining of Black students
through the “soft” racism of racial liberalism (settler hegemony).
But so long as the power structure of society remains settled, how can the primacy of
discipline be dislodged in favor of indiscipline—of unsettling? The psychically wounded white
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teacher of East Side offers a clue. When he says, “You want us to lie down and take it,” he
reveals the political-symbolic economy of race that structures his relations with others: a white
educator of Black students. To have his disciplinary power revoked is to remove his status as a
subject (master, sovereign). To lie down and take it implies receiving violence, of becoming an
object—of being educated. Although the producers of East Side couldn’t imagine such humility,
another South African cultural producer—J. M. Coetzee—charted a vision in his novel Disgrace,
released the same year as the series. Of the two primary white characters, one, a university
professor disciplined for having sexual relationships with students, can’t imagine giving up
power either. He can’t quite comprehend his daughter’s co-existence with her Black employee,
Petrus, and his family on her rural farm, especially not after she’s raped by one of Petrus’s
associates. The father urges his daughter to report the attack to the police, but she declines to do
so; later he suggests she move to Holland—a return to South Africa’s historical metropole. She
refuses:
“No, I’m not leaving. Go to Petrus and tell him what I have said. Tell him I give up the
land. Tell him that he can have it, title deed and all. He will love that.”
There is a pause between them.
“How humiliating,” he says finally. “Such high hopes, and to end like this.”
“Yes, I agree, it is humiliating. But perhaps that is a good point to start from
again. Perhaps that is what I must learn to accept. To start at ground level. With nothing.
Not with nothing but. With nothing. No cards, no weapons, no property, no rights, no
dignity.”
“Like a dog.”
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“Yes, like a dog.”47
The radical imagination of the daughter—to “start at ground level, with nothing”—allows her to
redistribute her resources both materially and psychically. Giving back the land to its rightful
“owners” means she gives up the mastery that structures settler colonialism and racial capitalism.
She becomes “like a dog” in the father’s representation: a humiliated non-human.
Becoming like “dogs”—if more settler South Africans followed suit, then perhaps the
non-event of decolonization that was 1994 can become a reality: a true model of transformation
for all.
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FIG. 5
Photograph of archival document “Towards a Successful National Anti-Crime Strategy”
(green markings mine).

Kennedy 103
FIG. 6
Photographs of selected scenes from East Side.
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CHAPTER THREE

Trap Spaces, Trap Labor: Emancipation, the Carceral State, and Trap Music

The critique of freedom exemplified by the loophole of retreat—a space of freedom that
is at the same time a space of captivity—and the difficulties experienced in trying to
assume the role of free and self-possessed individual prefigure the critique of
emancipation advanced by former slaves in the postbellum context.
—Saidiya Hartman (1997)

This writing starts—or started—at Medgar Evers College, CUNY, where, several winters
ago, a student played rapper Fetty Wap’s song “Trap Queen” in a class I taught long before the
track dominated radio and then pop culture, its video accumulating more than half a billion views
on YouTube.1 The debut single by a then unknown New Jersey artist, “Trap Queen,” about a
heterosexual couple who run an outlaw drug business, benefited from two main factors on its
way to iconic status: (1) social media, which carried the song from a specialist audience to the
mainstream over many months; and (2) Fetty Wap’s savvy reframing of the “trap” subgenre of
hip hop, in which he replaced the fugitive narratives and menacing sonics at the core of the trap
form with a story of legal unburden and a rosy aurality. In this way, “Trap Queen” deployed a
representation of Black freedom in lieu of a realistic account of negotiating the carceral state—a
trompe-l’oeil that illustrates anew the political work of dominant entertainments in maintaining
the status quo of liberalism.
“Trap Queen” similarly proves a generative case study for another “trap” embedded in

1
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time”; the song also tops search results on Genius.com for “trap.”
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liberalism: the rhetorical inclusion of women in ostensibly progressive depictions of social life—
an inclusion that simultaneously excludes Black feminist and anti-misogynoir ideas and
practices. Fetty Wap accomplishes this double maneuver by centering a woman—the eponymous
“trap queen”—as an equal partner to his character in business and life, thus demonstrating a
baseline tenet of liberal (white) feminism: equity between cisgender men and women in both
domestic (reproductive) and employment (productive) spheres. Yet what the video elides in this
appearance of parity is that Black women engaged in criminalized activity are generally not
equal partners to male participants. Worse, because of the structures of race, gender, white
supremacy, and heteropatriarchy, Black women are both more likely to participate in
criminalized endeavors than white women and to do it to survive abusive relationships—
interwoven structural trends that are functions of the legacy of enslavement and the concomitant
idealization of white womanhood. In other words, in presenting an idyllic vision of heterosexual
Black partnership, “Trap Queen” occludes both the carceral state and the raced dimensions of
gender. And this propensity to obscure the material experiences of Black women is writ large
across U.S. society, especially in mainstream attention to state violence against Black people, as
the social-media campaign #SayHerName seeks to show.2
As the concluding chapter of my dissertation, the subsequent analysis returns to and
extends my opening meditation on how the crimes of the racial-capitalist and settler-colonial
state are displaced onto Black, dark, or otherwise racialized flesh and reproduced through the
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coerced labor of gendered bodies: the historical and ongoing trauma incurred by peoples of the
African diaspora and refracted in the corporeal and material debts of indenture and bonded
servitude. In solidarity with Hortense Spillers and other Black-feminist and feminist-of-color
scholars and activists, I wish to further interrupt the reflexive dismissal of intersectional
experience and analysis, underscoring once again how “the master’s tools will never dismantle
the master’s house.”3

Interlude: Medgar Evers

In my English composition class in the spring of 2015 at CUNY’s Medgar Evers College, I
decided to try a pedagogical tactic I had learned from a friend: to play music at the beginning of
each class, in part as a way to change student perceptions of what a classroom could be. Though
Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed was first published in English 50 years ago and is still
regularly cited by educators, the typical classroom continues to operate on what he calls the
“banking model,” in which an expert at the head of the class deposits knowledge into passive
pupils.4 My teaching works against this disciplinary structure, especially when I’m working with
BIPOC students, who are hierarchically positioned to bear other types of discipline as well, and
with more force. I think now of Ta-Nehisi Coates’s introduction to his 2015 book Between the
World and Me, which became the reading for a course-wide final exam for a different
composition course at Medgar Evers the following semester. In it, Coates rails against the
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2018). Originally published in English 1970.

Kennedy 107
strictures of a traditional schooling that was never meant for Black students but for incorporating
them into docile U.S. subject-workers disinclined to contest the norms of the racial-capitalist
workplace. I hoped to challenge this ideological formation through playing music in class,
selected by and presented upon by students. Not only would listening to their song choices
change the atmosphere of our classroom, but it would also give the students more control over
how the class itself operated. To me, this is one of the primary aims of student-centered teaching:
to connect to students where they are and build the course around their needs and interests. And
the turn to music worked as I hoped. Over the course of the semester, as student after student
opened class by streaming their song pick and then briefly commenting on it, the classroom vibe
began to feel more inclusive and comfortable because it was. They also became more confident
writers and speakers as they bridged the “close reading” of their song with our collective
attention to the formal course texts, all literary work by BIPOC women. Music is now a
cornerstone of both my teaching and research practice, as evidenced by this chapter.
Later, in a graduate classroom, I discovered that engaging music in the classroom space
amounts to a small act of “epistemic disobedience” to the settler-colonial order of things as
theorized by Sylvia Wynter.5 Indeed, I would eventually read former Medgar Evers professor
Carmen Kynard’s account of teaching at the college in which she directly invoked Wynter.
Discussing the disciplinary constraints of English studies as they pertain to first-year writing—
what Kynard, following the compositionist S. Crowley, calls “Institution Freshman English”—
she noted that her “students have a clear counter-knowledge and politics that could challenge and
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rupture [Institution Freshman English].”6 Kynard further observed that Wynter “might call [this]
an epistemology rooted in ‘the specificity of [their] own existential situation’”—a type of
knowledge resisted by the institution of English studies.7 This resistance is because English
studies as a discipline privileges the homo-oeconomicus genre of humanity (the
“Breadwinner/Investor subject of the nation-state”8) and thus “discard[s] many working-class
students of color to such an extent that they never want (or will be able) to see the insides of an
upper-level English class.”9 And yet, while such racialized and financially stressed students are
effectively pushed out of English studies, students who emulate the homo-oeconomicus figure
are also less likely to pursue English studies because of the discipline’s inability to make itself
seem valuable to them.
As a teacher of first-year-writing classes at Medgar Evers for two years, I had to navigate
these competing pressures on my predominantly Black students to learn how to write clearly and
persuasively, to progress further toward a college credential, and to reflect on their own
experiences and ideas in relationship to those of the writers we read. And my students as well
had to navigate: not just these expectations and their own educational desires but also the various
forms of labor, paid and unpaid, they did for employers and their families at the same time as
they carried full- or part-time course loads. I began to think about these entanglements as I
started to hear Fetty Wap’s “Trap Queen” on local hip-hop radio, remembering that it was a
student of mine who initially focused my attention on it. I tried to think about why my student
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liked the song. I never asked him. I wasn’t then in the practice of following up with students after
a given course ended, but I also wanted to challenge myself to think as expansively as possible
about why “Trap Queen” was resonating with an increasing number of people—to understand
what role, if any, I, as an abundantly privileged white scholar-teacher, had in analyzing the song
and responses to it—a rich and intriguing cultural text but one evocative of various African
American and Black experiences that weren’t mine.
Looking back more analytically, my time at Medgar Evers provided the crucial third link
of this study. I knew I wanted to include gangsta rap as one of my foci, but I hadn’t yet come up
with anything innovative to say about it. Indeed, in feedback to a funding application I submitted
to an external agency for dissertation development and guidance, one of the anonymous
reviewers stated just that: that I wasn’t offering anything new to the question of power and
representation vis-à-vis gangsta rap because all I was doing was observing that artists speak back
to power. As a result, I kept thinking about my baseline interest in subaltern gangster expressions
that contradicted dominant or otherwise unconsidered understandings of the gangster genre.
Eventually I started to ponder the mechanics of this relationship: Why did these contradictions
exist? And why was the subaltern always in a position of inferiority to the dominant, if not of
outright erasure altogether? I began to speculate that there was something to the way dominant
genres operate that allows this status quo—this stasis—to go on. In writing this chapter, and then
my second and first chapters, I developed the argument of appropriation and neutralization that is
now at the center of this study.
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Trap Spaces, Trap Labor

Set in a New York City trap house—an apartment that serves as the hub for an illicit drug
enterprise—Fetty Wap’s 2014 song and video “Trap Queen” depicts the stacks of U.S. currency
and the manufacture of product that are core aspects of the genre of trap music. But the song and
video also portray an outlier to this strategic essentialism: namely, the loving romance at its
center, which challenges the mainstream common sense of the misogyny of rap. Likewise, the
sonics of “Trap Queen”—upbeat, even joyful—contrast with the aural hardness of much of the
genre. In these ways, “Trap Queen” is an important pop-cultural political intervention against
both the enduring pathologizing of Black life and the sense of siege with which many Black
people, especially poor ones, are perceived to live.
But while Fetty Wap’s persona in “Trap Queen” can be understood as a homo
oeconomicus (to use Wynter’s phrase) of the informal economy—a breadwinner who can selfdetermine his own life, albeit within the narrow bounds of criminalized business—that burdened
self-possession is doubled for his female partner, presented as a woman who’ll happily do
anything for her “man,” from cooking crack to giving him a lap dance.10 These labors are shown
to be uncoerced. Nevertheless, the larger structures of the racial-capitalist formal economy
essentially force many Black women into such gendered survival labor. Indeed, the situation of
these women, which Fetty Wap’s “trap queen” only partially evokes, illustrates the thinness of
freedom under liberal democracy, of which emancipation from slavery is considered
paradigmatic. But while emancipation secured the “right” to wage labor for people whose toil
was formerly unfree, Lincoln’s celebrated proclamation left in place the overall system of racial
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capitalism, which, twinned with settler colonialism, continues to structure daily life and self and
collective imaginaries in representatively governed nation-states like the U.S. Indeed, 155 years
after Black people were said to become free, the dual traps at the heart of “Trap Queen”—that of
the fugitive male protagonist, and that of his idealized female counterpart, a fugitive herself—
suggest that emancipation is a profitable form, in many ways, of entrapment.
In the following, I think through two related ideas of “trap” for what they reveal about the
ongoing contours of the afterlife—or afterlives—of slavery. The first and foundational notion I
attend to is Harriet Jacobs’s attic space in Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl (1861), where
Jacobs hides for years until she can make her way north to ostensible freedom. And yet,
following Saidiya Hartman’s well-known discussion in Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery,
and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America (1997), Jacobs’s predicament—stuck between a
possible return to bondage and a possible permanent escape from it—continues to vex her in her
New York City life.
The second notion of “trap” to which I turn is the structural compulsion for Black women
to engage in criminalized survival labor. Beth Richie named this tendency gender entrapment in
her 1996 study Compelled to Crime: The Gender Entrapment of Battered Black Women—an
overlooked analytical companion to Scenes of Subjection—and it isn’t substantially different
from Jacobs’s dilemma. That is, while Jacobs is able to find formal employment as a domestic
worker in late 19th-century New York, and the women of Richie’s study are able to find informal
employment as criminalized workers in the late 20th-century city, in both cases their labor
choices are effectively predetermined for them. In this way, they’re both trapped, or entrapped,
by political economic logics that profoundly shape the life chances of Black people.
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I argue that these twin notions of “trap”—incomplete self-possession on the one hand, and
the survival imperative to commit “crime,” on the other—converge in the outlaw drug economy
and its social relations that “Trap Queen” and the genre of trap music at large portray. Moreover,
the massive popularity of “Trap Queen”—viewed 592,863,832 times and counting—illustrates
the slippery political work of dominant forms of representation in managing both imaginaries
and mainstream common sense. This work can be seen especially when a cultural product from
an underground genre surfaces into widespread visibility, such as “Trap Queen” accomplished
vis-à-vis the trap genre. In Fetty Wap’s remixing of police escapes and portentous soundscapes
at the base of the genre into a story of freedom wrapped in feel-good sound, the carceral state
and the risk of entrapment into criminalized labor disappear and the trap house becomes an
anodyne site of home-based employment unencumbered by the rule of law and its agents. The
trappers, meanwhile, become like royalty, rising from the bottom of normative social, political,
and economic life to its apex.
Fantasy is one of the key levers of pop music: for the three or four minutes of a song or
video, listeners and viewers trade their positions in the status quo for ones of improved status. In
this way, “Trap Queen” is a pop masterwork: it re-presents the real-life traps that structurally
unemployed Black people face as moments of carefree, though gendered, abundance. The vision
Fetty Wap purveys replaces the threat of capture and control that has shadowed Indigenous
peoples from the African continent and their descendants in the U.S., both before and after
Emancipation, with a fiction of unfettered will and self-containment. No doubt this optic does
important affective labor. But is that emotional-psychic reward worth the trade-off in attention to
material reality, especially at the scale of “Trap Queen’s” audience, most of whom may now
have Fetty Wap’s representation as their only reference point for “trap life”? And if that trade-off
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is not worth it, what must be done to change this process of re-presenting material reality for
mass success?
I turn next to a reading of Jacobs’s own struggle to re-present the realities of enslavement
to counter the distortions of the slaver class in the South and the (willful) ignorance of liberal
readers in the North—a dynamic, albeit renovated, that now describes the circulation of cultural
and other commodities globally. I follow this section with a new analysis of Hartman’s
influential Scenes of Subjection chapter “Seduction and the Ruses of Power” to draw out the
deep entanglements of enslavement and criminalization on the one hand and discourses of
freedom on the other. I then examine the intertwined emergence of the carceral state and hip hop
in the late 20th century and the trap genre’s innovations of the early 21st century before homing
in on “Trap Queen” and gender entrapment. I conclude by offering a few more thoughts on the
politics of popular culture today.

Captivity, “Crime,” and Property in the Self: Three Afterlives of Slavery

On one level, the thinness of emancipation is not surprising: critics of liberalism have
shown time and again that the political economic system of representative democracy yoked to
private enterprise falls far short of providing individual rights and personal freedom for all.11
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Genuine self-determination, instead, is reserved only for people who have amassed enough
capital of their own that they don’t depend on the wage relation, directly or indirectly, for their
livelihood. Indeed, it was Hartman’s conception of the “afterlife of slavery” and the “illusory
freedom and travestied liberation” of formal emancipation that arguably catalyzed anew
scholarship from a Black and Brown perspective on the sharp limits of liberal humanism.12 In
this section, however, I examine three afterlives of slavery that have not received as much
attention as some of Hartman’s other interventions in Scenes of Subjection: namely, “crime,”
captivity, and property in the self.
As she makes clear in the chapter that centers in part on Incidents in the Life of a Slave
Girl, captivity and “crime” are closely linked in historical U.S. slave law. This link was secured
through the contradiction of slave agency: enslaved people were understood to be captive, on the
one hand, because of their enslavement—not persons but property—and agential, on the other
hand, to rationalize their punishment. Writes Hartman: “The slave was recognized as a reasoning
subject who possessed intent and rationality solely in the context of criminal liability; ironically,
the slave’s will was acknowledged only as it was prohibited or punished.”13 Moreover, this cruel
irony of agency and captivity was most profound in the context of the rape of enslaved women,
who “could neither give nor refuse consent, nor offer reasonable resistance, yet they were
criminally responsible and liable.”14
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Further, because of the routine rape of enslaved women by their owners and the small
acts of resistance of such women even in the context of sexual assault, enslaved women faced
greater criminalization than enslaved men. Hartman tracks this dynamic in Jacobs’s reflection in
Incidents on her tactics to rile her master, such as when Jacobs writes (via the pseudonym Linda
Brent) that “I knew nothing would enrage Dr. Flint so much as to know that I favored another;
and it was something to triumph over my tyrant even in that small way.”15 In response to such
transgressions, Jacobs recalls Flint calling her “criminal towards” him; as Hartman notes, the
“repeated use of the term ‘crime’ throughout the narrative documents the displacement of
culpability onto the enslaved and crime as a predominant mode of black subjection.”16 Indeed,
“crime”—Hartman brackets the word with quotation marks—“in its elasticity, encompasses all
efforts to escape, expose, and redress injury.”17
Although there are other arguments about the origin of “crime,” Hartman makes a
persuasive case here that “crime” is always already criminalization: that is, an “elastic” concept
deployed by powerful actors to prevent challenges to the harm enacted through their power.
Indeed, this point is part of the overall critique of “crime” I advance in this study. Moreover,
Hartman’s attention to the elasticity of “crime” prefigures Ruth Wilson Gilmore’s attention to
the same in her analysis of the political economy of “crime” and mass incarceration in Golden
Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing California (2007). In that work,
Gilmore also defines “crime” as “an elastic category,” one “spanning a dynamic alleged
continuum of dependency and depravation.” Further, she shows how the elasticity of the
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category of “crime”—what I call the genre of “crime”—is fixed in material space and structures:
land, built environments, alliances between political economic actors, and networks between the
state and capital.18 I attend to this analysis more in the next section, in which I contextualize the
immediate backdrop of trap music, but suffice it to say for now that Hartman’s and Gilmore’s
respective arguments underscore the intertwined representational and material links between
criminalization under slavery and post-slavery, particularly in the backlash to the Second
Reconstruction that Gilmore and other anti-carceral scholars trace.19 Too, the notion of “crime”
as elastic means that “crime” is textual: it has no inherent, authoritative meaning because it’s a
relation of power, with parties across that relation struggling to author the text and gain the upper
hand of signification. If the racial-capitalist and settler-colonial state is always ahead in that
contest, even if it loses a bout here and there or seems permanently up against the ropes, it’s
because its textual representations are literally grounded. It’s one thing to contend on a
representational field; it’s quite another to uproot the infrastructure and redirect the resources of
the carceral state. In the same way that genre fixes reality figuratively, the state fixes reality
materially.
There is a similar elasticity to the concept of captivity. For instance, after she escapes
Flint, Jacobs’s attic hideaway—a trap space where she famously spent seven years eluding her
captor and his “slave-hunters”—is not only a place of “imprisonment,” as she describes it, but
also a place of refuge, and one that offered small but important pleasures, such as “a glimpse of
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one twinkling star.”20 Indeed, the “loophole” Jacobs “bore” through the attic enclosure afforded
her a bit of fresh air, not to mention frequent sightings of her children.21
The title of the chapter in which Jacobs discusses the loophole is called “The Loophole of
Retreat.” Hartman understands retreat in this context as “a space of freedom that is at the same
time a space of captivity,” a double bind that illustrates “the difficulties experienced in trying to
assume the role of free and self-possessed individual.”22 As such, “freedom” for Black people
post-emancipation is a kind of trap, burdened by both the legacies of enslavement and the
exploited labor of the wage, the latter “underlined” for Hartman by “Jacobs’s continued
servitude” as a domestic in New York City, whose only “newly acquired property” is “the
self.”23 In other words, although Jacobs is free, she is still subject to the wage relation and to the
residual effects of the chattel relation upon which the wage relation is based. Put differently,
whereas Jacobs was directly forced to work under enslavement, she is now indirectly forced to
work by the terms of “free” labor under racial capitalism. She has moved, that is, from chattel
slavery to “wage slavery,” which is distinguished precisely by the fact it is not chattel slavery.
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So, while Jacobs now “owns” herself, she owns nothing else and must work to live—and work in
a severely limited labor market for Black people.
The survival efforts of Jacobs and other Black women, whether enslaved or fugitive,
nonconsensual laborer or wage worker, also underline Hartman’s theory of “akin to freedom,”
based on the distinction Jacobs makes between “giv[ing] one’s self” to a lover versus
“submit[ting] to compulsion” in the case of the master’s sexual demands.24 “There is something
akin to freedom” in the former scenario, Jacobs writes. As Hartman points out, however, this
“something akin to freedom” is fully circumscribed by the much greater agency white women
had in this regard by virtue of white supremacy and the legitimacy of the white family.25
Nevertheless, in keeping with Jacobs’s other acts against the dehumanizing, sexually violating
system of slavery, her notion of “something akin to freedom” is among the “possible gains to be
made in the context of domination.”26
Hartman, in turn, traces the components of this “akin to freedom,” writing that, “like
freedom itself, [it] reveals the indebtedness of liberty to property and to an alienable and
exchangeable self.”27 Moreover, while “[t]his order of property”—of giving one’s self to
another—is “markedly different from that of chattel slavery,” “sexuality is at the heart of this
exchange,” just as it is (was) under chattel slavery.28 It is this political economic analysis, arrived
at through her consideration of “crime” and captivity, that characterizes the burdened
individuality and travestied liberation of post-emancipation Black people. Hartman shows, in the
first instance, that becoming free meant becoming free to work for a wage: that is, to be
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exploited for profit rather than being owned as a commodity. In the second instance, she
demonstrates that this shift in contractual relations for Black people—from a self that is owned
by contract, to a self that is one’s own, to contract out for hire—is authorized by both racial
capitalism and heteropatriarchy. Emancipation, then, can be understood as an entrapment into
racial-capitalist wage work, rather than freedom from the wage and racial capitalism. And at the
center of that entrapment is the gender entrapment of Black women, forced to do whatever they
can to survive, whether nonconsensual labor, wage work, or “crime.”

Akin to Freedom: The Carceral State and the Trap Genre

Like Harriet Jacobs and many other formerly enslaved people, trap as a music genre also
moved from the U.S. South to the North, albeit at a much later historical moment. The genre was
popularly codified through Atlanta rapper T.I.’s 2003 album Trap Muzik, the first song of which,
eponymously titled, presents the key features of the genre. First, the idea of the “trap,” which is
likened both to a “dope house” but also to a larger predicament for Black recording artists that
includes the music industry (suggested by the couplet “This a trap / This ain’t no album”).29 The
second feature is a sense of fugitivity—“Man wherever I be / The feds got me scoped out”—but
one not limited to the narrator’s involvement in an outlaw drug business. Rather, the feds have
him “scoped out” “wherever I be,” a clear statement of the fugitive ontology that overwrites his
life. Indeed, midway through the song comes the sound of police sirens, and then the sounds of
running and jumping a metal fence.
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As this defining track demonstrates, trap music as a genre depicts the carceral state and its
primary targets: the surplus population of people who have been structurally unemployed from
the formal economy for any number of reasons and who, in many cases, have turned to informal
economies to make a living. And because they’re employed in such criminalized enterprise (such
as the illegal drug trade), they face a higher risk of contact with the police and the criminaljustice system—and, therefore, a higher risk of imprisonment. These risks are compounded for
Black people because of the way “crime,” historically, is attached to them in the afterlife of
slavery and because of how anti-Black discrimination in education and the formal economy
continues to leave many Black people out of work following the collapse of Fordist industries
with the onset of contemporary globalization in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
California was a bellwether for the emergence of the carceral state, given both the size of
the state’s economy and the influence of governor-turned-president Ronald Reagan. Indeed, the
growth of the prison-industrial complex in the Golden State was directly related to the political
economic need, as Gilmore writes, to “take more than 160,000 low-wage workers off the
streets.”30 These workers were one of four surpluses idled during the U.S. recession of the 1970s,
the others being finance capital, land, and state capacity.31 The “prison fix” became a way to put
those surpluses back in action while also addressing restive out-of-work and insecurely
employed groups of people. The political cover for this economic reconfiguration was an
enhanced deployment of law-and-order politics through campaigns such as the “war on crime”
and the “war on drugs.” In other words, “crime” became the problem that needed to be solved.32
The state “solved” it, in part, by ramping up its criminalization of poor and low-income people
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and capturing them in cages. In sum, as prison became a “fix” for various social issues the state
no longer wanted to address as it shed public services, structural unemployment became a “setup for criminalization,” as Tryon Woods has put it vis-à-vis women and the global prisonindustrial complex, building upon Richie’s theory of gender entrapment.33
At the same time as the carceral state was emerging in California, soon to take hold
elsewhere in the U.S., New York City underwent its own political economic transformation:
from a robust welfare state to a state of austerity. Triggered by the city’s fiscal crisis of the mid1970s, financial capitalists, other elites, and the Ford administration worked together to
dismantle the public services the city had amassed since the Great Depression in a formidable act
of neoliberal revanchism.34 Across the city, at least half a million jobs were lost from the late
1960s to the mid-1970s, and as many as one-and-a-quarter million people faced cutbacks to their
public assistance (a prelude to “workfare”). The City University of New York, which only a few
years earlier had opened admissions far more than ever before, started charging tuition, which
immediately reduced student enrollment. Meanwhile, racist spatial policies like urban renewal,
redlining, and blockbusting meant that poor and low-income New Yorkers were also more
housing insecure just as they experienced greater financial insecurity.
In post-Fordist, post-fiscal-crisis New York, then, economically disenfranchised people
had been re-routed from their longstanding neighborhoods to new ones devoid of jobs,
experiencing what Mindy Fullilove has called “root shock” in the process.35 And though
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construction of public housing boomed, the lack of formal work for their residents, particularly
for young women and men, meant that informal work had to fill the void. If housing projects
would later become a common site for the illegal drug trade, it only made sense. If people have a
place to live but no formal work, it’s only rational to become entrepreneurial and sell a product
that people want.
Hip hop, it bears reminding, emerged against this backdrop of political economic
transformation: the attenuation of formal jobs and public services on the one hand, and the rise of
the carceral state on the other. Indeed, in neighborhoods such as the South Bronx, the birthplace
of hip hop, youth unemployment was as a high as 80 percent in the late 1970s.36 “If blues culture
had developed under the conditions of oppressive, forced labor,” as Jeff Chang has written, “hiphop culture would arise from the conditions of no work.”37 More than two decades later, trap
music emerged as an ongoing chronicle of the latest forms of criminalization that Black and
Brown people contend with as they continue to encounter a scarcity of jobs and discrimination in
the formal job market. And, yet, this musical-lyrical archive of experience largely excludes
women as equal players, as “Trap Queen” pointedly shows.

Trappin’

Fetty Wap’s “Trap Queen” video, released August 7, 2014, has been viewed, as of this
writing, more than half-a-billion times, making it, arguably, the most widely seen depiction of a
trap house. As a set of lyrics and images, the song and video hew closely to the expected
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elements of the trap-music genre: verbal references to and visual shots of U.S. currency, often
being counted into stacks (here, by Fetty Wap’s character or his “trap queen,” or girlfriend); the
process of making product (here, cooking crack and meth on a stovetop); and weed smoking, of
which everyone partakes. The song’s connection to trap sonics, by contrast, is quite tenuous.
Instead of the genre’s signature hi-hat percussion and dystopian tone, “Trap Queen” sounds
open, laidback, and fun. Altogether, if trap music is typically a bleak account of so-called “thug
life,” then in Fetty Wap’s hands this life becomes a joyful heterotopia in which selfdetermination can be achieved sans interference from the law. No doubt this bracing vision of
possibility goes a long way toward explaining the song and video’s massive popularity, on par
only with Katy Perry’s and Rihanna’s fellow crossover trap tracks “Dark Horse” (2013),
featuring well-known trap artist Juicy J, and “Bitch Better Have My Money” (2015),
respectively.
Although trap music may seem “apolitical,” particularly in contrast to the liberal
humanism purveyed by, for example, Kendrick Lamar, politics is more than ideology, belief, or
conscious intent.38 Indeed, cultural studies scholars from Stuart Hall to Richard Iton have shown
that mass cultural products are profound sites of politics, perhaps especially when they’re
“unrecognizable as politics,” as Iton has written.39 Moreover, “a deep engagement with popular
culture might enhance our understanding of developments in the formal political arena
and…compel a revision of our notions of the political.”40 Trap music, then, like any other form
of cultural production, is a productive venue to trace political developments and possibilities.
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Further, given its deviance from liberal norms, trap music is a formidable example of what Iton
calls the “black fantastic”: that is, “the minor-key sensibilities generated from the experiences of
the underground, the vagabond, and those constituencies marked as deviant.”41
Arguably, the primary “minor-key sensibility generated” by “Trap Queen” is its
representation of an informal economy in which waged work might not exist. I write “might not”
because it’s unclear from the song and video what the economic arrangements are of this
particular illicit enterprise. Certainly, the depiction of the “trap queen” herself is scored with
multiple kinds of unwaged domestic and emotional labor, befitting the song and video’s
heteropatriarchal framework. And the labor of the lower-level employees—the court attendants,
as it were, in this quasi-monarchical vision—is almost out of the frame entirely, save for a few
glimpses in the background.
On the other hand, given the absence of police or any other threats to the trappers’
security and livelihood, the scenario presented by the song and video could be construed as a
post-racial-capitalist future, in which Black people either control the means of production or are
agents in some other economic arrangement. In this interpretation, the drugs stand in for any
goods of trade. It’s the possibility of genuinely unfettered self- and collective determination
that’s the point, not what the goods are. Indeed, the substitution of an actual fruit pie in the video
for the kilo of coke referred to in the lyrics as “pie” completes the fantasy of the song’s
narrator.42 That is, he has transposed the material circumstances that entrap people in the outlaw
drug business for a vision of life independent of those circumstances. Furthermore, this vision is

41
42

Iton, 16.
“Trap Queen,” Genius.com, https://genius.com/Fetty-wap-trap-queen-lyrics.

Kennedy 125
a type of “gain” that can be made in the context of domination, as Hartman averred vis-à-vis
Jacobs’s constrained agency as an enslaved person who can nevertheless give herself to a lover.
Then again, this liberatory possibility is foreclosed by its marginalizing of the female
character. Since heteropatriarchy is inseparable from racial capitalism, it is impossible to be free
of one and not the other. The moniker “Trap Queen” is an honorific applied to the male
narrator’s female partner but it belies the exploited labor she contributes in support of the man’s
agency and pleasure. The song and video elide her plight in a humorous sleight-of-hand that
obscures not only her gendered labor, here a send-up of stereotypical labors and desires that
inhere in the figure of women under heteropatriarchy, but also the material harms women
involved in trap houses or the outlaw drug industry overall may suffer.
The flicker of self-determination on view in “Trap Queen” is also compromised by the
song and video’s own status as a product of the U.S. mass-entertainment industry. Without
putting too fine a point on it, the purpose of such products is to generate profit for the
corporations involved. So, while “Trap Queen” makes a couple of political interventions—its
interruption of the pathetic accounts of Black life as promulgated by liberal-democratic
discourse, and its fleeting sense of an alternative future—these inroads are compromised by the
structures of racial capitalism, which will not allow a fully liberatory image or narrative to take
flight.
Indeed, the song and video’s erasure of the police and the prison-industrial complex
overall contributes to the mystification of the conditions of life and labor that trap music, as an
underground genre to that moment, had worked to expose. In other words, the incomplete
heterotopic vision “Trap Queen” unveils—arguably the reason for its popular success—obscures
the struggles of real-world “trappers” to make a living under arduous circumstances. And these
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workers include women, who must contend not just with racial capitalism but with
heteropatriachy, too.

Gender Entrapping

Published one year before Scenes of Subjection, Beth E. Richie’s Compelled to Crime:
The Gender Entrapment of Battered Black Women is an important intertext for the former.
Although the two works emanate from different disciplines and deploy different methodologies,
they’re both focused on the subjection of Black women to violence—and their concomitant
criminalization—as a function of political economic design. Specifically, Richie’s emphasis on
battered and criminalized Black women being “forced to make hard choices with very few
options” tracks with Hartman’s focus on the double bind of enslaved women in coerced sexual
encounters with their masters, as well as with the overall burdened individuality of Black people
post-emancipation.43
In her interviews with three groups of poor women detained at New York City’s Rikers
Island jail—Black battered women, Black non-battered women, and white battered women—
Richie discovered the elements that would form her theory of gender entrapment. Extending the
normative legal definition of entrapment, “which implies a circumstance whereby an individual
is lured into a compromising act,” Richie defines gender entrapment as both the circumstances
that cause battered Black women to commit crimes and the penalties they face in the criminaljustice system for these acts. These penalties are meted out despite the infractions being “logical
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extensions of their racialized gender identities, their culturally expected gender roles, and the
violence in their intimate relationships.”44 In essence, the women’s social and economic
conditions set them up for criminalization. They couldn’t leave their abusive male partners for
financial reasons, and they didn’t want to leave out of fear of being perceived a failure, by
themselves and by others. Meanwhile, stereotypes of Black women as tough and resilient
foreclosed the possibility of any nuanced understanding of their predicament. People assumed
the battered women should’ve been able to leave their partners, or that the abuse they suffered
wasn’t as bad as it was. As Richie writes, “The factor that distinguished the African American
women who were battered from those African American women who were not battered was the
degree to which they aspired to the ideological norm” (her emphasis).45 Importantly, this
ideological norm derives from the convergence of the historical logics of white supremacy and
heteropatriarchy—a convergence that is part of the afterlife of slavery and which continues to
mediate the perceived being of Black women through the fictions of white womanhood. In this
way, the idealized female partner of “Trap Queen” opens a window onto one of the primary
dynamics undergirding gender entrapment: the aspiration to fit a normative (white) female
gender role.
The enduring charge of misogyny against Black male rappers is a historical tension.
Indeed, the charge gave rise in part to the theory of intersectionality developed by Kimberlé
Crenshaw Williams, who took the obscenity trial of 2 Live Crew in 1990 as an occasion to
reflect on a certain scholarly privileging of the harm to Black men over that to Black women.46

44

Richie, 4.
Richie, 135.
46
Kimberlé Crenshaw Williams, “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence Against Women of Color,” Stanford Law Review 43, no. 6 (July 1991): 1282–1283.
45

Kennedy 128
While she too opposed the prosecution of 2 Live Crew, Williams highlighted the way Black
women were marginalized in the discussion of the trial, and, further, how Black women were
generally marginalized “by a politics of race alone or gender alone.”47 She concluded that “a
political response to each form of subordination [racial and gendered] must at the same time be a
political response to both.”
At this current historical moment, when intersectionality theory and identity politics are
criticized from both the left and the right—even as the right continues to operationalize
perceived white suffering in service to a renewed white-supremacist movement—analyzing a
popular text like “Trap Queen” in its multiple dimensions is all the more important. Against the
fierce, multi-pronged campaign by elites to mystify both the material conditions of life and the
social relations of people, all products of racial capitalism require scrutiny. This assessment is
perhaps never more urgent than when fictions pose as truths, whether in the case of “Trap
Queen” or emancipation at large. We must always watch out for the traps, and “say her name,”
as activists both online and offline call us to do.

Emancipation as Entrapment

Finally, “Trap Queen” is a cautionary tale for how to achieve popular success today. By
taking arguably the most important trope of the modern age—freedom—Fetty Wap mystified the
material conditions that entrap structurally unemployed Black people into criminalized activity.
In so doing, however, Fetty Wap also obscured the work of gender, intersecting with race, in
entrapping some battered Black women into “crime.” As such, and against the song and video’s
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progressive tendencies, a conservative, even reactionary, politic is “trapped” inside “Trap
Queen”: the reproduction of the logics of white supremacy and heteropatriarchy that first
converged in the development of racial capitalism and settler colonialism on the bodies and lands
of Indigenous peoples across the world. In other words, the very same rationale used to
criminalize both enslaved Black women in the U.S. and some battered Black women postemancipation is reflexively deployed in “Trap Queen” through the guise of freedom—that is,
emancipation by another word.
In some respects, this contradiction is nothing new: cultural products of high
consumption have always been riven with tensions both historical and contemporaneous. Instead,
what I seek to underscore vis-à-vis “Trap Queen” is how the dictates of mass entertainment—
popular culture—require many Black artists (and many Indigenous artists and artists of color) to
play by the rules, as it were, of racial-capitalist and settler-colonialist structures like
heteropatriarchy and white supremacy in order for these artists to be heard and seen. This
compulsion to reproduce dominant norms is also a form of entrapment, albeit a profitable,
metaphorical one, in stark contrast to the structural entrapment of people by dint of race and
gender, which offers no long-term profit for them but incarceration or the ongoing threat of it.
To be clear, Fetty Wap is not to “blame” for purveying a fantasy into worldwide renown
and better odds at staying power in the music industry and mass-entertainment firmament than
most debut artists. But the trap laid inside that vision—the alibi of emancipation that covers for
the gender politics of slavery—makes it harder to abolish the structure of entrapment at the core
of the carceral state. Accordingly, to achieve genuine abolition once and for all, mass movements
are needed (as ever), not mass entertainments, no matter how transformative the latter may seem.
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FIG. 7
Screengrabs of Fetty Wap’s “Trap Queen” video.
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CODA

Toward a Nongrammatical Relationality (and an End to Violence)

One of the things I love about sculpture is the way you understand a sculpture is by
relating it to your own body, so you feel its edges and its presence in space by that
relationship. When I think about a young Black child relating to that sculpture, it’s very
exciting for me.
—Simone Leigh (2019)

I.
Harriet Jacobs’s loophole of retreat gained new prominence in 2019 in transdisciplinary
visual artist Simone Leigh’s show Loophole of Retreat at the Guggenheim Museum in New
York.1 Comprised of several sculptures mixing classical European references with Africandiasporic influences, plus a sound installation and short-film cycle, the exhibition was contained
in one of the intimate galleries off to the side of the Guggenheim’s spiral ramp, which, when I
visited, displayed “Six Takes on the Guggenheim Collection” by other contemporary artists. If
all works of art—and expressive cultures overall—are syncretic, meaning that they reflect
different influences from a range of sources—then Leigh’s artistic production is consciously so.
Indeed, she has called her practice “formal creolization,” which the Loophole of Retreat curator
described as “channeling the cultural fluidity that is a legacy of colonialism.”2 Though I haven’t
found, as of this writing, Leigh’s own description of formal creolization, the basic premise of
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creolization is the fusion of different cultural or artistic objects to make something new.3 In other
words, if you take a mode from one culture and mix it with a mode from another culture, and that
mixture results in a new form of culture, then you have achieved creolization. In this way,
creolization is different from appropriation, in which an element from one culture is incorporated
into a second culture, but that second culture remains largely the same as it did before the
addition of the element from the first culture. This contrast—between a fusion that creates a new
form and an assimilation that consumes a non-dominant form—can be seen in the main
competing metaphors about the U.S. vis-à-vis immigration: the mosaic, in which the cultures of
heterogeneous groups of people originally from elsewhere in the world stand out as distinct
features on their own terms, and the melting pot, in which all those cultures are blended together,
each culture disappearing into a larger and larger whole. In this way, cultural appropriation or
assimilation is like universalism: a process of subsumption rather than differentiation. And yet
multicultural liberal democracies, like those of this study’s three primary sites, are fundamentally
tasked with managing different groups of people to maintain a functional society (as opposed to
one in crisis). Moreover, such political societies must also determine how to allocate the myriad
resources that come with sizable domestic populations in the form of taxes, which support the
state’s spending priorities with or without the consent of the governed. Accordingly,
differentiation is at odds with universalism, and pluralistic national communities present multiple
points of tension with the uniformity that nationalism requires.
The notion of the consent of the governed is one of those tricky Enlightenment—and
therefore liberal—ideals because it covers up for the fact that many groups of people the world
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over have not consented to be governed in the first place. Indeed, it was the late Barbadian
intellectual Kamau Braithwaite who adapted the idea of creolization—previously a way of
explaining entanglements between different material-object histories, especially in the Roman
context—to think through the challenges posed by communities of Indigenous peoples, formally
enslaved peoples, settlers, and arrivants all living together in postcolonial Caribbean nationstates.4 After all, “creole” comes from the Spanish “criollo,”5 which designated a Spanish subject
who was born in one of Spain’s colonies in the New World: not an original settler, but the
immediate descendant of one. This initial connotation eventually shifted to mean people who
were born of differently racialized parents, such as the creoles of Haiti or Louisiana, who were
oftentimes the children of a slaveholder and an enslaved woman but who also might have
claimed other heritage or identified in ways not dependent on the color line between whiteness
and Blackness. In fact, creole communities were frequently a separate entity altogether from
their more rigidly racialized counterparts, either because their specific cultures were unique to
them or because they couldn’t be assimilated into the imported racial logic that differentiated
people by their “races”—which is to say their racial types, or genres.
A longer consideration of the history and politics of creolization is beyond the scope of
this short, speculative rumination, but the affordances of Leigh’s formal creolization—both her
mixture of forms and her intentional practice of creolizing—are particularly evident in her
human-scale sculptural works, such as those that were on display in the Loophole of Retreat at
the Guggenheim. These affordances are partially due to the viewer’s relationship to the
sculptures, and partially due to how that relationship can alter the subject-object relation that

4

See, for example, Kamau Brathwaite, Contradictory Omens: Cultural Diversity and Integration
in the Caribbean (Mona, Jamaica: Savacou Publications, 1974).
5
Webster, “Creolization.”
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undergirds human inequality as reproduced by racial capitalism and settler colonialism. In the
first instance—the viewer’s relationship to Leigh’s sculptures—the artist has explained that
sculptures activate more than just a person’s visual sense. Indeed, as she says in the epigraph of
this coda, sculptures also activate one’s bodily awareness, to the point that the way “you
understand a sculpture is by relating it to your own body.”6 Moreover, once activated, this
corporeal relation might lead the viewing, embodied subject to think differently about the
ostensibly sightless, unbodied object in front of them. In this way, a Leigh sculpture is more
“being” than “object,” as critic Sharifa Rhodes-Pitts has written: a human-like creature who is
“perhaps taking measure of who was in the room, making note of who was looking.”7 As the
viewer then, you might realize that “what was being looked at was looking back at you.”8 And
not just looking back at you, but being back at you. What does it mean when an object you’ve
taken for lifeless turns out to have a life? When a putative object is looking back at you, defying
its objectness? What does that make you, the putative subject? What does it make me, the author
of these thoughts—these pages?

II.

Grammar means many things. First and foremost, grammar is “the whole system and
structure of a language or of languages,”9 in which one part of the system or structure relates to

6

“Artist Profile: Simone Leigh.”
Sharifa Rhodes-Pitts, “For Her Own Pleasure and Edification,” Guggenheim Museum,
https://www.guggenheim.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/guggenheim-sharifa-rhodes-pittessay-simone-leigh-hugo-boss-prize-2018.pdf.
8
Rhodes-Pitts.
9
“Grammar,” Google.com, https://www.google.com/search?channel=cus2&client=firefox-b-1d&q=grammar.
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another part. In the English language, the paradigmatic example of this grammatical relationality
is the relationship between the subject and the object: the subject does, while the object is done
to, and the subject generally appears first in a sentence, the object following in second place. In
this dissertation, for example, I have explored dominant notions and practices of genre and
“crime.” “I” is the subject of the preceding sentence, and “dominant notions and practices of
genre and ‘crime’” are the objects. But throughout this study I have also examined various forms
of resistance to genre and “crime” by non-dominant peoples—a statement in which “I” is again
the subject and “various forms of resistance to genre and ‘crime’ by non-dominant peoples” are
the objects. In both cases, the subject—“I”—is acting upon the objects; furthermore, the “I” is
me, the author, which means that I am also the actor (versus the acted upon). Put another way,
the “I” is the self-determining Subject of Denise Ferreira da Silva’s analytics of raciality, the
“conquistador”10 of Tiffany Lethabo King’s relations of conquest.
And yet, for all the force of the subject-object relation in grammar—one continually
reproduced by every sentence that abides by “correct” English grammar and by every person
who obeys the larger grammars that organize dominantly English-speaking societies—the
hierarchy of subject over object is a fiction. For one thing, the majority of the world’s languages
don’t conform to this subject-object order, although the perpetual growth of English as a lingua
franca or second language for many people underscores the continuing reach of the former
British empire and the American neo-empire. Too, the increasing population of global English
speakers attests to the persistent spread of commodity relations, which are inseparable from the
subject-object relation. In this fashion, not only is English understood as a valuable object to

10

King designates the “conquistador” as the super-settler positionality that only white settlers
can occupy, in contrast to other settler positionalities that are racialized. See King, The Black
Shoals, xii.
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possess (a commodity), but the use of English by speakers whose first language has a different
relationship between subject and object might subtly influence such speakers to adopt the
subject-object relation of English grammar in contexts beyond language. In such a scenario,
these speakers—subjects—may come to regard other people as objects as well: depersonalized
commodities with which to have transactions rather than fellow humans with whom to affiliate.
Though I engage the Latin roots of “affiliate”—“affiliat,” or “adopted as a son”11—with caution
given both the masculinist formation of its meaning and the role that Greco-Roman history has
played in securing narratives of European civilization, to affiliate with someone at least points to
a kin relation instead of a commodity relation.
And such a redirection—from a commodity relation to a kin relation, or from a subjectobject relation to a relation between beings undetermined by any value form—is offered by
Leigh’s sculptures. With their black surfaces and Afrocentric references, they may look Black, or
the racial type assigned to people who are visibly descended from African peoples. But with their
semblance of being, the sculptures are simultaneously familiar and unknowable: familiar because
they could be a person like me, unknowable because how would I describe what kind of being
they are? How would I—the ostensible author—subject these beings to the order of English
grammar if I don’t know whether they’re objects? I could prosecute these unknown entities
according to that grammar even if they don’t hold up as objects, or I could pause and reconsider
the order of things that positions me as subject and all other entities as objects. In other words,
through her sculptural interventions into space and subject-object relations, Leigh counters
longstanding metaphysical assumptions about the fixity of order. Indeed, given that order is a

11
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synonym for discipline, Leigh undisciplines form, allowing form to be shaped by in-person,
“live” relationships, in contrast to the general order of things that shapes those relationships
toward dominance and subjection.12 Put differently, if people generally conform, Leigh’s work
invites people to not conform. To deviate from the form. To disobey.

III.

As I was finishing this manuscript, my students at Gettysburg College were reading Toni
Morrison’s Sula, a cornerstone of my teaching that I developed in collaboration with my students
at Medgar Evers. The novel follows Incidents in the Life of Slave Girl in my syllabus, even
though the two works were published almost a century apart. I go against chronological order in
presenting these texts to students because where Incidents ends, with the emancipation of Jacobs,
is where Sula begins, with the emancipation of another enslaved person. Unlike the forthright
purchase of Jacobs by Mrs. Bruce, however—a white abolitionist who makes no other claims on
Jacobs, her nanny, but for her “free” labor of child care—the slaveholder who offers his coerced
laborer freedom does so at a price, and through a cruel ruse. The passage, from the prologue to
Sula, is worth quoting at length for the representational dynamic it distills: a miniature
demonstration of the overall process I’ve tracked and analyzed in this study of the impacts of
racial capitalism and settler colonialism on global Anglophone cultural politics and political
cultures:
A good white farmer promised freedom and a piece of bottom land to his slave if he
would perform some very difficult chores. When the slave completed the work, he asked

12
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the farmer to keep his end of the bargain. Freedom was easy—the farmer had no
objection to that. But he didn’t want to give up any land. So he told the slave that he was
sorry that he had to give him valley land. He had hoped to give him a piece of the
Bottom. The slave blinked and said he thought valley land was bottom land. The master
said, “Oh, no! See those hills? That’s bottom land, rich and fertile.”
“But it’s high up in the hills,” said the slave.
“High up from us,” said the master, “but when God looks down, it’s the bottom.
That’s why we call it so. It’s the bottom of heaven—best land there is.”
So the slave pressed his master to try to get him some. He preferred it to the
valley. And it was done. The nigger got the hilly land, where planting was backbreaking,
where the soil slid down and washed away the seeds, and where the wind lingered all
through the winter.13
The more I’ve taught Sula, the more I’ve understood this scene as a paradigm of how race and
representation operate in the U.S. context. Morrison would go on to describe the fundamental
role of race in American literature in her 1993 critical work Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and
the Literary Imagination, in which she asserts that any literary representation of blackness is
axiomatically a representation of race.14 But this moment in Sula would seem to prefigure that
full-bore argument. Indeed, the phrase “playing in the dark,” save for a preposition, could
describe the white farmer’s toying with his “slave”: that is, playing with the dark (person) and
his sense of basic facts—the personness of the enslaved person an afterthought for the
slaveholder, if he thought of enslaved people as people at all. And yet there’s nothing innocuous
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about this play, which is demonstrably harmful to the enslaved person and his kin, racialized as
dark, Black—the farthest from God’s light in the Christian schema that was weaponized as part
of the slavers’ representational arsenal. Although the slaveholder gets a kick out of the “joke”15
and profits from the exchange, his land eventually turning into a well-to-do bedroom community
by the mid-1960s, when Sula ends, his property—now “free”—has to continue laboring under
difficult working conditions in a thoroughly unequal system. Crucially, this gerrymandering
turns on a representation of truth that is false: namely, that the hilly, almost barren land
ostensibly closer to Heaven is actually “rich and fertile”—“the best land there is.” While the
enslaved person questions this representation—“But it’s high up in the hills”—his freedom from
slavery depends on his response to his master’s proposal. Morrison’s narrator doesn’t let readers
into the enslaved person’s interiority, so the full scope of his thinking can’t be known.
Regardless, any internal deliberations about the proposal before him can’t alter the choice he
must make: either accept the low-quality land and gain his freedom, or reject it and remain
enslaved. In this way, the enslaved person of this fictional narrative is entrapped like all enslaved
people were materially, their agency significantly curtailed but not eliminated entirely. The
slaveholder’s joke in Sula is of a piece with the ruse of seduction in Incidents. Neither the
novel’s enslaved figure nor Jacobs herself, contending with her own master’s multiple pursuits
for her, had good options—they had less worse choices, and each took theirs. In both cases, their
freedoms were contingent upon other people’s designs. Once again, representation amounted to
re-presentation: the calculated substitution of something false for something true in order to
monopolize resources, power, and the law.

15

“A joke. A nigger joke. That was the way it got started. Not the town, of course, but that part
of town where the Negroes lived, the part they called the Bottom in spite of the fact it was up in
the hills.” Morrison, Sula, 4.
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Taken together, the artistic interventions of Leigh and Morrison and the factual
interventions of Jacobs—along with her real-life escape from slavery into racially differentiated
“wage slavery”16—prompt a number of questions. Among them: Is it possible to upend the
subject-object relation by refusing the prestidigitation of representation? If so, what other forms
of relation based on the original subject-object relation would have to change to secure the
elimination of representation textually and materially? Further, how might forgoing
representation as a mode of both cultural production and political production—aesthetics and
governance—contribute to the reparation of the New World into something different and
unknowable in advance? Would violence vanish? And what would I have to do differently as a
professor of knowledge to participate in these strategies? How can I better engage difference
while further reducing the violence of differentiation? I have no answers to these questions now.
Instead, I will keep working for a world in which there is no subject or object, nor top nor
bottom, “just circles and circles”17 of feeling for each other without harm.

16

The idea of “wage slavery” comes from Karl Marx’s comparison between wage labor and
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FIG. 8
Screengrabs of Simone Leigh’s Loophole of Retreat show.
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